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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is a case study of Toyota Motor Corporation’s movement from communicative 
failure to communicative success during the massive 2010 auto recall. It is the author’s 
contention that the movement to success was accomplished through a sub-genre of apologia 
known as atonement. Atonement not only provided a way for the automaker to repent, 
demonstrate mortification, and take actions to address the needs of its audience of Toyota 
owners, but also provided a way for Toyota to return to the narratives, ideology and values that 
are part of the Toyota Way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The acknowledgements for my Master’s Thesis was extensive and those thanked there for 
their support, love, and encouragement, are similarly acknowledged here. However, my Kansas 
Ph.D. adventure, and subsequent dissertation, requires acknowledging a whole new host of 
mentors and friends. 
First, my gratitude to Dr. Robert “Robin” Rowland for his superb academic and personal 
support. Not only did he guide me towards becoming a stronger rhetorical critic, but he also 
allowed that growth to include my passion for creating a damn good story along the way. 
Personally, he was there when my life took an unexpected and serious health turn. He demanded 
I take the time to take care of me. What he probably doesn’t know is that a large part of that 
healing process involved carrying forward with the dissertation research and writing because it 
provided some sense of normalcy during a period that wasn’t normal at all. 
Second, my thanks to the other fabulous members of my dissertation committee who 
were equally supportive and encouraging during the dissertation process and the dark times. Beth 
Innocenti for her, “You can do this,” attitude;  Debbie Ford, for her sharp organizational rhetoric 
commentary; Tracy Russo for her acute editing eye and thoughtful commentary, and Suzy 
D’Enbeau for her contribution of journal articles that have expanded my perception of 
organizational scholarship.  
Third, my gratitude and love to the wonderful women of the R.S.G.: Beth, Greta, Krista, 
Jaclyn, Robin, and Sue. We groaned and grew together, marked comps and dissertation defenses, 
celebrated NCA appearances and awards, and life in general. No matter how far apart we may be 
geographically, the soul of our friendship continues. Blessing on you all. 
v 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Chronology of the Recall         vii 
Chapter One: Accelerating Towards a Communication Disaster   1-32 
 Introduction         1  
 Image Maintenance        5 
 Overview of Apologia       9  
 Cultural Considerations of Rhetorical Constraints    17 
Study Methodology, Rhetorical Artifacts and Chapter Progression  21 
Notes          24 
Chapter Two:  History of the Crisis & the Toyota Way    33-52 
History of Toyota Motor Corporation and the Inception of    33 
the Recall Crisis 
Shinto as the Way of Nature & the Toyota Way    40 
Notes          48 
Chapter Three: The Rhetoric of Atonement      53-63 
Atonement Rhetoric as Ritual Response     54 
Atonement as Toyota’s Appropriate Response to the Crisis   57 
Notes          62 
Chapter Four: Regaining the Road: Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement  64-102 
A Fatal Accident and Near-Fatal Early Responses    64 
Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement      69 
vi 
 
Audience Reaction to Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement   90 
Why Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement Succeeded    94 
Conclusion         96 
Notes          96 
Chapter Five: “Moving Forward”: Toyota’s Road Trip Post-Crisis   104 -112 
and Final Considerations of This Study 
Toyota’s Post-Crisis Return to Normality     104 
Summary         105 
Implications and Inquiry       108 
Limitations and Inquiry       110 
Conclusion         111 
Notes          112 
Appendix          114-116 
Names and dates for Toyota presidents      115 
Five Main Principles of Toyoda & Guiding Principles at Toyota   116 
Bibliography          117-130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Toyota Crisis Timeline 
 
August 28, 2009   San Diego crash kills four members of Saylor family 
September 28, 2009 Toyota announces recall plans for 3.8 vehicles for floor mat 
issues but no date for recall established 
 
October 3, 2009   Akio Toyoda’s “litany of apologies” press conference 
January 21, 2010   Web-site announcement of pedal recall 
January 26, 2010   Production line shut down 
January 31, 2010  “A Temporary Pause” announcement 
February 2, 2010   “An Open Letter to Toyota Customers” message 
February 5, 2010   “There’s Been A Lot of Talk About the Recall” message 
February 7, 2010   Toyota “Commitment” video 
February 9, 2010   Akio Toyoda’s Washington Post letter 
February 11, 2010   Toyota “Restore” video 
February 23, 2010   Akio Toyoda’s Wall Street Journal letter 
February 26, 2012*   Toyota “Customer Perspective” video 
February 26, 2012*   Toyota “Dealer Perspective” video 
March 2, 2010    Toyota Kentucky “Team Member Perspective” video 
*Dates are based on video up-load date to You Tube  
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Chapter 1: 
Accelerating Towards a Communication Disaster: 
Overview of the Toyota Crisis & Literature Review 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the fall of 2009 Toyota Motor Corporation found itself facing what would eventually 
become one of the largest automobile recalls in the history of the industry.
1
 What started as a 
recall of cars with faulty floor mats soon burgeoned into a recall of cars with allegedly faulty 
accelerator pedals.
 2
  Over the next eight months the recall morphed into a variety of issues 
including faulty brakes, steering problems, stability control systems, drive-shaft issues, and even 
rusty spare tire cables.
3
 By April of 2010 Toyota had recalled some 9,000,000 cars including 
such familiar models as Toyota Corolla, Corolla Matrix, Camry, Avalon, Tacoma and Tundra 
trucks, the luxury Lexus and the “flagship” of the Toyota fleet, the eco-friendly Prius. 
The financial effect was devastating. According to New York Times’ reporter Nick 
Bunkley, Toyota's market share for January 2010 was 14.1 percent as compared to January 2009 
when the company had finished with a 17.9 percent market share.
4
 In early February Kelly Blue 
Book analysts dropped the used-car value for recalled Toyota models between one and three 
percent; by February 12, those numbers had been decreased by an additional 1.5 percent. 
5
 Over 
all, Toyota sales for February 2010 were down nine percent as compared with February, 2009 
sales, making it the only major automaker to suffer a sales decrease.
6
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Toyota faced other financial issues. According to Micheline Maynard of the New York 
Times, Toyota found itself facing “billions of dollars in lawsuits.”
7
 Moreover, as reported by 
Curt Anderson and Ieva M. Augstums of the Chicago Sun Times, insurance companies were 
mounting investigations on ways to recoup payouts to Toyota owners whose vehicles had 
allegedly accelerated suddenly, resulting in injury and in some cases deaths.
8
 Finally the 
company faced and eventually paid a $16.4 million dollar fine from the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
9
 
Other problems also plagued Toyota. The company was accused of withholding 
information regarding the accelerator problems.
10
 Questions were raised about the relationship 
between Toyota and the NHTSA because Toyota had hired former NHTSA employees.
11
    
More damning were the questions raised about the lack of investigation into complaints about 
Toyota by the NHTSA.  Eric Lichtblau and Bill Vlasic likened the process to “a Kabuki dance of 
sorts,” in which the federal agency would open an investigation, the auto giant “would promise 
answers,” and “nothing would come of it.”
12
  Toyota’s lack of cooperation in addressing 
problems also ran counter to the almost sacred “Toyota Way,” the company’s core values. 
According to Aida Sevilla Mendoza, the Toyota Way involves both “high-lighting and solving 
problems instead of hiding them,” as well as “instilling a self-critical culture that fosters 
continuous and unrelenting improvement with perfection as the ultimate goal.”
13
 Clearly, the 
company fell short of its professed philosophy. 
Finally, Toyota was criticized for its crisis communication. The company was slammed 
for their overall slow response to safety issues – even before the 2009 recall. James Kanter, 
Micheline Maynard, and Hiroko Tabuchi characterized the problem as “part of a lengthy 
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pattern.”
14
  Advertising Age reporters Michael Bush and Rich Thomaselli noted that as the crisis 
moved from January into February of 2010, Toyota’s management was mostly silent and what 
was being communicated was characterized as “a mish-mash of legalese.”
15
 The president of 
Toyota was faulted for a two-week delay in responding publically when the crisis peaked in 
February of 2010.
16
 In an interview with San Francisco Chronicle reporter Carolyn Said, Buford 
Barr, a Santa Clara University marketing and advertising lecturer, lamented that “Toyota has 
broken every rule of good crisis management that I have ever taught.”
17
 Buford, whose number 
one example of poor crisis communication had been Exxon during the 1989 Valdez disaster, 
went on to note that, “now Toyota is going to take over that ‘bad’ slot.”
18
  Given the extent of the 
financial repercussions, the allegations of withholding information, and the faulty nature of its 
crisis communication, Toyota Motor Corporation was in dire straits. 
Yet author James P. Womack, who, according to The New York Times has “written 
extensively about Toyota,” offered a cautionary note in the midst of the crisis. In early February, 
Womack told The Times that “betting against Toyota has been a good way to lose money.”
19
 His 
words proved prophetic. By late March Toyota was rebounding. According to New York Times 
reporter, Nick Bunkley, Toyota sales rose 41 percent in March of 2010 over March 2009 figures. 
Sales of the 14 models initially recalled shot up 48 percent. Moreover, 60 percent of those sales 
were to past Toyota customers.
20
 One company executive noted that although incentives were 
offered, “I don’t believe anyone would buy a new car or truck from a brand they didn’t trust.”
21
 
That trust had rebounded was evident in that Toyota’s brand reputation index rose from a 
February 2010 low of -7.8 to 19.6 in June of 2010. Most surprising were the results of a July 
2010 rating by Wall Street that ranked the 10 biggest brands that “lost substantial chunks of their 
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brand valuation.”
22
  Toyota was on the list, but was dead last. Daily Finance columnist Douglas 
McIntyre noted that although the company had lost nearly $6 billion of brand value in the first 
half of the year, “Toyota’s 2010 story had one surprisingly twist: U.S. vehicle sales haven’t 
fallen.”
23
 In fact, McIntyre argued, Toyota sales were up 9.9% during the first half of 2010. 
Curiously, all of these positive indicators occurred even as Toyota continued to recall 
vehicles. How was this possible? Exactly how was the embattled car maker negotiating the 
shifting terrain of recalling vehicles, while working to regain audience trust in its damaged 
brands?  One possible explanation is that Toyota substantially altered its crisis communication 
and appropriately addressed the crisis. I contend that Toyota engaged in a rhetoric designed 
move the car maker back on its path of quality, to the Toyota Way. In the following pages I build 
this argument by first arguing for the importance of image maintenance as an over-arching 
purpose for all organizations in which messages of branding and values are paired to create 
congruency between an organization and its publics. Second I move beyond this discussion of 
image maintenance strategies to defining what a crisis is towards a larger discussion of image 
repair. This entails a review the literature related to apologia in which scholars alternately argue 
for perspectives based on purpose and motive as driving strategic responses or arguments for 
why crisis situations drive the strategic responses. Fourth, I argue for another perspective in 
which constraints, particularly cultural constraints, play an important role in crisis rhetoric. 
Finally, I review literature on apologia as shaped by cultural constraints and how this applies to 
Toyota.  
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The Importance of Image Maintenance  
In order to understand Toyota’s communication during the 2010 recall crisis, it is helpful 
to understand the concept of organizational image. The following section is not intended to be an 
exhaustive review of the literature related to the concept of image. My intent is to define image 
from an audience viewpoint, and to highlight two broad strategies, branding and corporate 
citizenship, that play a role in maintaining the audience’s favorable view of an organization.  
Image, branding, and corporate citizenship 
At all times organizations should work to maintain a positive image with their various 
stakeholders. Following Keith Michael Hearit, I define image from the perspective of the 
audience; “a receiver-based interpretation that people make about organizations based on 
individuals’ intermittent past experiences with an organization.”
24
 It is because organizational 
messages are open to interpretation that image maintenance is important. Rowland and Jerome 
have argued that image maintenance is an over-arching purpose for all organizations because of 
the need to maintain positive relationships with stakeholders.
25
 
Image maintenance is accomplished through strategies of identification in which, to 
paraphrase Kenneth Burke, the purpose is to join the interest of the organization with the interest 
of its audiences; to “display the appropriate “signs” of character needed to earn the audience’s 
good will.”
26
 The audience’s good will is earned in two ways. First, the organization strives to 
made its products known through branding. Second, the organization strives to prove that it is a 
good corporate citizen by advocating for, and identifying with, larger social values. 
First, the organization works to establish identification through branding messages or 
what Hoffman and Ford defined as the use of “visual and verbal strategies used to call forth 
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identity in the minds of the audience.”
27
  Rhetorically, branding acts as an enthymeme in that the 
slogan or visual trigger taps other associations. Chaim Perelman argued that the importance of 
enthymemes lies in their ability to create presence because in “prolonging the attention given 
them, their presence in the consciousness of an audience is increased.”
28
 For example, the Nike 
“swoosh,” triggers an association with the Nike slogan – “Just do it” – which links to the Nike 
product of athletic wear and ultimately to the company itself. In other words, audiences do not 
have to see the written Nike slogan in order to associate the slogan with the symbol. 
Additionally, branding creates presence based on the audience’s perceptions of quality and what 
Dawar and Pillutla defined as brand trust or “reliability, dependability, and trustworthiness.”
29
 
Thus branding messages link an organization to its goods and services and to desirable qualities 
that the audience expects of the organization via its goods and services.  
The second way in which organizations work to earn the good will of their audiences and 
thus enhance their image is to engage in strategies designed to espouse shared social values. 
Organizations must demonstrate that they are both decent and caring social members.
30
 The 
modern corporation acts in such a way that it is perceived by its publics as being a single actor.
31
 
For example such statements as “IBM announced today” or “General Motors has decided to” are 
a natural way of talking about corporate actions. Cheney and McMillan have argued that when 
society frames the many voices of an organization as a “society entity,” the audience “is invited 
to treat the organization as a person speaking.”
32
 By extension then, the organization is expected 
to hold to the norms and values of society as if it were an actual person. In turn, Keith Hearit 
contends that organizations are deemed legitimate when “corporate activities are congruent with 
the values of the social system in which they [the organization] exist.”
33
 Denise Bostdorff and 
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Steven Vibbert argued that organizations build and maintain their images by engaging in 
“values-advocacy” or “epideictic advocacy” through messages designed to create a shared sense 
of values that both audience and organization share.
34
 When an organization professes 
congruence with causes and issues that a community values, the audience is more likely to view 
the organization as part of the community, as a “good corporate citizen” rather than a monolithic 
outsider.
35
 The on-going interactive process of maintaining corporate image through branding 
and advocacy is similar to Ware and Linkugel’s apologia strategy of bolstering, which is “any 
rhetorical strategy which reinforces the existence of a fact, sentiment, object or relationship.”
36
 
Thus through branding, identifying with and adhering to the values of the society in which it 
operates, an organization will be deemed a legitimate member of that society.  
Organizational crisis and product recalls 
Scholars have defined organizational crises in different ways.  According to Pearson and 
Clair, an organizational crisis is a “low-probability, high-impact situation that threatens the 
viability of the organization.”
37
 Ulmer, Selnow and Seeger extended this definition arguing that a 
crisis is “a specific, unexpected, and nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels 
of uncertainty and threaten or are perceived to threaten an organization’s high priority goals.”
38
 
Thus organizational crises can be defined as discrete, disruptive events that take an organization 
by surprise. 
Another approach to defining organizational crises is characterized by the argument that 
organizations are complex systems that occasionally break down, and these break downs are part 
and parcel of organizational life. According to Astrid Kerstan, such a perspective of crisis asks 
that scholars and practitioners see a crisis as “a stage in the organization's development, a natural 
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expression of the way it operates and an element of its normal functioning.”
39
  In this perspective 
a crisis is not something that happens to an organization, but rather is something that happens as 
part of the organizing process. Moreover, because crises events are part of an ongoing life-cycle 
of an organization, they offer the chance for the organization to learn from the experience.  
Product recall crises provide this opportunity for learning. According to Dirk Gibson 
product recalls occur “relatively frequently” and are “one of the most consistent of American 
economic phenomena” with an average of six recalls a day.”
40
 In the case of automobile recalls 
there are millions of vehicle recalls each year.
41
 For example, Rick Newman pointed out that in 
December 2009 alone “there were at least eight separate recalls that each involved thousands of 
passenger cars.”
42
 Despite the frequency of automobile recalls there is no denying that auto 
makers suffer when their car woes are made public. According to Kathleen Cleeren and her 
colleagues, when recalls occur, consumers may elect to purchase competing brands, or in the 
case of cars, a competitor’s brands. The result is that the company is likely to face “a damaged 
image and a substantial drop in consumer trust.”
43
 For example, it took Audi ten years to regain 
the trust of consumers following a series of sudden acceleration issues in the mid-1980s.
44
 In 
short, a product recall crisis seriously damages the image that consumers hold of the automaker.  
Thus, when a crisis hits an organization the congruency between the organization and its 
audiences is disrupted. In terms of branding, company logos and slogans now become linked 
with the crisis. The result is a negative association between an organization and its products. A 
1995 study conducted by the advertising agency DDB Neelham found that out of 2645 
consumers surveyed, 85% considered how a company handles a crisis to be the one of the top 
five factors that influence consumers’ decisions of what and from whom to purchase products.
45
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Moreover, the legitimacy of a crisis-ridden organization may be questioned by the society in 
which it operates in what Keith Hearit characterized as “the emergence of public animosity” 
towards the organization.
46
 Although Bostdorff and Vibbert argued that values advocacy can 
build up a reservoir of credibility that can be called upon to deflect criticism, this may not be 
adequate in a crisis situation. For example, a petroleum company espousing views of 
environmental concern may be perceived as hypocritical by an audience when the same company 
downplays the negative environmental effects of an oil leak. The effect of a crisis then is that it 
demands responses that go beyond those used to maintain a favorable image of the organization 
by consumers.  In short, organizations shift their message strategies from a singular focus of 
image maintenance to a dual focus on image maintenance and image repair.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
An Overview of Apologia 
Given the extent to which organizations go to establish and maintain their image as 
legitimate providers of goods and services within society, it makes sense that when faced with a 
crisis, the modern organization also engages in discourse designed to address the crisis and 
reestablish congruency with their audiences. This discourse is known as apologia or what Ware 
and Lingkugel defined as “a public speech of self-defense, the apology.”
47
 Not surprisingly 
scholars have sought ways of both explaining and predicting how organizations have and should 
engage in apologia. In this section I review the literature on differing approaches to personal as 
well as organizational apologia. These approaches can be defined in three ways. First, there are 
scholars who argue that purpose and motive states drive apologia messages. Second, there are 
scholars who argue that the crisis situation drives the rhetorical responses of individuals and 
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organizations. Finally, a third argument is that there are constraints acting upon the individual 
and organization that function to shape the apologia.  
Purpose, motive states and strategies 
Current research on how organizations shape crisis discourse owes much to Ware and 
Linkugel’s 1973 conceptualization of apologia. Ware and Linkugel contended that apologia is a 
separate genre and thus constitutes “a distinct form of public address,” in that occasions arise 
when what is questioned is not the policies that a person espouses but rather a person’s “moral 
nature, motives, or reputation.”
48
  In other words, a person’s image is at stake. A number of 
studies have illuminated the ways in which people in the public eye have confronted and 
defended themselves when accused of public and private transgressions.
49
 
According to Ware and Linkugel, when faced with charges of impropriety, a speaker 
purposefully sets out to absolve, vindicate, explain or justify actions in light of the charges 
leveled. 
50
  Depending on one’s purpose, a speaker may use four dominant strategies: denial, 
bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence.
51
 Taken together, purpose and strategy result in a 
typology that aids the critic in categorizing different speeches of defense. However, Ware and 
Linkugel were careful to note that the combinations of strategies are not fixed because each 
speech of defense is “in some sense unique,” that is, each speech arises out of different 
circumstances and each speaker uses a variety of stylistic devices. Thus Ware and Linkugel 
invited other scholars to expand and elaborate on their original argument. This invitation led to a 
myriad of different approaches, all aimed at pinning down the rhetorical situation in personal and 
organizational apologia.  
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Some scholars have argued that apologia is best understood by the critic when considered 
in partnership with the kategoria, or accusatory discourse that triggers apologia. Halford Ryan 
contended that the two can be compared by examining the structure of the speeches themselves.  
According to Ryan, by evaluating “the issues in the accusation,” the driving motivation of the 
accuser can be compared to what motivates the accuser to respond to the accusation.
52
   In 
creating what Ryan characterized as a “speech set,” a critic has a more rounded view from which 
to critique the success or failure of both sides. In a similar vein, Keith Hearit argued that 
inasmuch as an accusatory stance questions the ethics of an organization, the organization 
engages in what Hearit defined as “kategoria-based apologia.”
53
 In a sense, such an approach 
turns the tables by leveling counter-arguments about the ethics of the accuser. In doing so, the 
apologists rhetorically dissociates themselves from the charges, in effect distancing themselves 
from the charges of wrongdoing. The strategy of disassociation allows the apologist to “bifurcate 
a unitary concept (i.e., the accusation of wrongdoing)” by claiming that the charges do not 
represent the reality of the situation and thus are nothing more than an appearance of 
impropriety. Thus, through a turn of terminology, an organization redefines the rhetorical 
battlefield to its advantage. 
Another scholar who built on Ware and Lingkugel’s work is William Benoit. Benoit 
developed an expanded typological system for addressing apologia. Benoit’s theory of image 
restoration and its attendant typology consists of five broad categories: denial, evading 
responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. Additionally, Benoit 
argued that within three of the broad categories – denial, evading responsibility, and reducing the 
offensiveness of the act -- lie variations of the broader category. For example within Benoit’s 
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category of denial one can either out-and-out deny the accusation, or one may shift the blame to 
another party. Evading responsibility may involve strategic variations of claiming the accused 
was provoked to such actions, that the accused acted on good intentions and things went awry, 
that the actions are defensible, or that the precipitating event was an accident. The category of 
reducing the offensiveness of an event may involve strategic variations of bolstering, 
transcendence, minimizing, differentiation or compensation. Additionally, the accused may elect 
to turn the tables and attack their accuser.  
Using the image repair typology, Benoit and his colleagues have analyzed a number of 
organizational crises and their attendant strategic responses. These studies have included such 
varied contexts as an analysis of Texaco Oil Company’s response to accusations of racism, 
Exxon Oil’s attempts to repair its image in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Firestone’s 
image restoration efforts in light of their recall of defective tires, USAir’s apologia following the 
fatal 1994 crash outside of Pittsburgh, and Sears’ corporate discourse when accused of fraudulent 
car repairs in 1992.
54
  
One important conclusion of the analysis of this organizational discourse is that creating 
a narrative of corrective action is a key component of successful apologia. In both Sears’ and 
Texaco’s crisis communication were clear indications of the importance of a consistent narrative 
of corrective action. In the case of Sears, this narrative failed because the company first attacked 
the California Consumer Agency that led the investigation but then switched to messages of 
corrective action which, Beniot argued “invited suspicion.”
55
 In contrast, Texaco created a 
believable narrative in that there was congruency between the messages and the subsequent 
actions – the narrative “evolved over time.”
56
 However, corrective action involves deeds as well 
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as words. Czerwinski and Benoit contended that USAir’s attempt at corrective action amounted 
to “an attempt to gloss over its problems,” rather than offer effective corrective action.
57
  
Moreover, there must be congruency between what an organization promises and what the public 
perceives. Exxon tried to argue corrective action, but the highly visible oil spill damage and 
Exxon’s slow response made this an ineffective strategy. Overall then, corrective action on the 
part of the organization must be perceived as genuine and pro-active by the audience; actions and 
words must be congruent. 
As widely applied as it is, Benoit’s image repair theory does not address all facets of 
apologia. Ware and Linkugel, Ryan, and Benoit addressed how apologists create strategic 
messages responding to a crisis. However, as Huxman and Bruce argued, the characteristics of 
the situation must be considered when critics evaluate the success or failure of a particular 
apology.
58
 Thus the relationship between situational characteristics and strategy formed the 
springboard for other research approaches to organizational crisis discourse. 
Situational characteristic and strategic responses 
 As argued earlier, organizational image is an audience construct based on how the 
organization conducts itself as a social actor. Thus an audience attributes characteristics to an 
organization.  Building on this perspective, Timothy Coombs proposed Situational Crisis 
Communication Theory (SCCT), arguing for a “theory-based system for matching crisis 
response strategies to the crisis situation.”
59
  In this perspective the crisis event is the driving 
force behind why an organization responds and how it responds.  
Situational Crisis Communication Theory builds on Coombs’ earlier works in which he 
proposed that it is the audience’s perception of the crisis that drives the strategic responses of the 
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organization.
60
  Foundationally, SCCT is grounded in Attribution Theory because, “different 
crisis situations facilitate certain attributes of organizational responsibility for a crisis, and these 
attributions can lead people to certain feelings and behaviors.”
61
 Another key component of 
Coombs’ theory takes its cue from a relational management perspective which is “embedded in a 
movement that places the organization-stakeholder relationship as the center of the public 
relations practice.”
62
  Between these two theoretical perspectives, Coombs developed a 
“repertoire of crisis-response strategies.”
63
 Coombs’ five category repertoire integrates Benoit’s 
image repair typology with Allen and Caillouet’s strategies for image maintenance.
64
 However, 
Coombs moved beyond a repertoire of strategies to the creation of a four-part attribution-based 
matrix of crisis-types.
65
 Coombs tied his matrix to how different audiences “might view 
evidence, damage, and performance history.”
66
 In his later research, Coombs focused on the 
effect of prior crisis events on how stakeholders’ view the organization’s responsibility regarding 
the crisis. Coombs’ research demonstrates the importance of audience perceptions as related to 
the type of crisis in considering how organizations should shape their crisis rhetoric. 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that existing crisis communication research, 
though grounded in the rhetorical genre of apologia, has evolved into a range of different 
approaches. It is also evident that the primary focus on this research has been to understand how 
organizations respond to crises in order to predict how organizations should respond when faced 
with a crisis. However, as Rowland and Jerome have previously argued, if the purpose of 
research is to develop theory, then focusing on what strategies can be used or the specifics of the 
situation will not suffice. For example, in the case of strategic responses, a recent meta-analysis 
conducted by Sora Kim, Elizabeth Johnson Avery, and Ruthann W. Lariscy found that theory 
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and practice have not been congruent. These researchers concluded that although denial is “only 
useful when the crisis challenge is unwarranted,” the organizations studied by scholars largely 
used denial, despite the crisis context. 
67
 Moreover crisis communicators seemed unwilling or 
unable to effectively combine crisis strategies. According to Kim, Avery, and Lariscy there is a 
“general gap between theory and practice, and future research should illuminate its cause.”
68
 It is 
clear that often what is prescribed is not practiced in the field. 
The problem with situational approaches is that typologies depend on similarties among 
crisis situations. However, it is Keith Hearit’s contention that crisis research has overemphasized 
the similarity rather than the dissimilarity of crisis events. For example product recalls are as are 
as nuanced and unique as the recalled product.  Thus qualitative differences influence crisis 
responses. For example, recalling faulty baby strollers is qualitatively different than the recall of 
implanted body parts as was the case when Sulzer Medica recalled some 17,5000 hip implants in 
2000.
69
 Alerting the public to return strollers to stores or manufacturers is vastly different from 
alerting the public to return themselves to the operating room to have the offending part removed 
and replaced. Moreover,as Hearit pointed out “it does not follow that a particular type of crises 
situation invariably necessitates the same strategy every time it occurs.”
70
 However adding the 
idea of constraint to the crisis rhetorical situation can help critics build defensible theories of 
apologia. The idea of constraint does not lessen the importance of the type of crisis event but it 
also acknowledges that other factors may be in plays that guide an organization in deciding what 
strategy to use or to not use. Thus, constraints serve to shape rather than determine the 
organization’s apologia.  
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Apologia shaped by rhetorical constraints 
The concept of rhetorical constraint played a central role in Lloyd Bitzer’s foundational 
essay in which he laid out the precepts of the rhetorical situation.
71
  Bitzer argued that constraints 
influence what the speaker says in relation to a situated audience.  In an important extension of 
Bitzer’s work, Rowland argued that genres arise from a configuration of three forces: a recurring 
situation that demands the need for a response, the purpose as it relates and is limited by the 
need, and societal limitations.
72
  These three forces act as both exigence, the need for the 
rhetorical response, and constraints. For example, the death of a loved one creates the need for a 
eulogy but also serves as the impetus for the appropriate response. This does not mean that a 
speaker must act in a certain predicable way but that a speaker “will choose to act that way 
because of the intersection of purpose, felt need, and societal factors.”
73
  Thus, the combination 
of purpose, need, and societal limitations create strategic demands that are not rules and should 
not be viewed as absolute predictors of a response. 
In consideration of the third force, societal factors, Rowland noted that genres are 
culturally bound, that they “exist within the general assumptions of the culture.”
74
 In terms of the 
present study, cultural assumptions include social and cultural norms regarding communication 
from an Asian-based corporation to its global, and in particular, American audience. Thus, not 
only are the societal factors of the American audience acting as a societal force, but the societal 
factors of Japanese culture also exert a force on both the perceived needs and the purpose of 
Toyota’s response. 
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Cultural Considerations of Rhetorical Constraints 
In considering organizational apologia, scholars acknowledge that social and cultural 
factors are important considerations. Taylor contended that cultural variability is “a fact of life” 
for the modern globally oriented organization interested in finding the best way to predicting 
how international audiences will respond to crisis messages.
75
  Falkheimer and Heide maintained 
that the nature of the modern crisis revolves around the problems and issues faced in 
communicating with and across different cultures.
76
 For example, when five sub-contractors, two 
of them Turkish Muslims, died during a Dutch construction project, crisis personnel had to 
contend with the cultural norm that dictates that men and women be notified separately of the 
deaths.
77
 Hearit argued that cultural variability constitutes one reason why researchers are likely 
to have “difficulty in delineating crisis types.”
78
 In a related vein, Krishnamurthy Sriramesh 
contended that in looking at public relations practices in Asia, scholars should be aware of the 
idiosyncratic nature of communication practices within each culture.
79
  When cultural constraints 
are examined within a Japanese context, two elements stand out: How cultural expectations of 
behavior constrain communication and how cultural expectations affect the nature of apologia. 
Japanese communication norms as rhetorical constraints on Toyota 
 Japanese norms of communicative behavior differ from those in the United States in that 
the Japanese put more of an emphasis on implicit rather than explicit message conveyance. Japan 
is considered a high context culture, in which, according to Takashi Inoue, “the tangible material 
exchanged is limited.”
80
 Hence, meaning and information are encoded within the context and 
within non-verbal cues to a greater degree than in the West. In comparison, the United States is 
considered a low context culture in that messages are largely verbal and explicit.  
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Differences in communication also influence how apologia is practiced in Japan in 
general and by Toyota specifically. Ware and Linkugel’s original argument for apologia was 
contextualized as being thoroughly Western in its approach. They concluded that when people 
speak in defense of themselves, they are following “a culture of Occidental culture firmly 
established by Socrates, Martin Luther, Robert Emmet, and thousands of lesser men.”
81
 Such a 
Westernized approach emphasizes the explicit nature of the individual speaking in the public 
forum in an attempt to persuade an audience. Japanese scholar Rochi Okabe characterized the 
Western approach as one in which individuals are expected to justify their actions, which entails 
verbally explaining “logically and discursively why something is true or good or desirable.”
82
 In 
contrast, Japanese concepts of rhetoric embody consensus seeking towards the establishment of 
harmony, through rhetorical strategies that emphasize the speaker’s use of “intuition, 
adaptability, and aggregation.”
83
  
Differences in explicit versus implicit communicative behaviors may explain why 
Toyota’s early rhetoric was viewed as less than successful with its American audience. For 
example, Alexander Edwards, President of Strategic Visions, an automotive research firm, while 
recognizing Toyota’s attempt to “do the right thing,” faulted the company’s for communicative 
efforts that “were not stated very clearly,” that, in turn, created “more uneasiness with 
customers.”
84
 In its coverage of Akio Toyoda’s congressional testimony, CBS news 
characterized Toyoda’s testimony before Congress as one in which “American directness 
confronted Japanese subtlety,” noting Toyoda’s proclivity for giving “long indirect answer(s).”
85
 
Moreover CBS described Japanese corporate leaders as “affable cheerleaders,” whose job it is to 
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“ensure stability and harmony.”
86
 What is evident then is that neither the company nor its 
president approached apologia in a manner expected by its American audience. 
Closely aligned with the notion of high context communication is how silence is viewed 
in terms of apologia. Generally speaking, the Japanese take a nuanced view of the 
communicative and rhetorical significance of silence. Okabe argued that silence is the “highest 
form of ritualistic self-expression and self-realization.”
87
 Silence, as  ritualized communication 
behavior, carries great rhetorical weight in that the audience, or what Okabe defines as the 
“rhetorically sensitive,” places as much as, if not more, importance on the non-verbal or extra-
verbal elements.
88
 In fact, these elements sometimes “assume greater importance in fulfilling the 
ritualistic function.”
89
 For the Japanese, ritualized behavior serves as a way to forge community 
connections across and through successive generations. Moreover, it is Okabe’s contention that 
rituals or rites serve the purpose of connecting members of a society in such a way that 
wholeness is achieved. Creating connections to achieve wholeness shifts the rhetorical purpose 
of apologetic messages. Rituals, in terms of apologia, “do not justify or explain; they only affirm 
and reassure.”
90
  Thus, when Akio Toyoda spoke at a February 17, 2010 press conference, he 
neither explained nor justified his long silence. He simply stated: “My appearance was late. 
That’s been done, and I am sorry. But now I’m here.”
91
   
In contrast, an American audience is likely to construe silence on the part of an 
organization embroiled in a crisis as problematic.
92
 Akio Toyoda and his company were roundly 
criticized for the length of time it took to respond to the crisis. In an interview with San 
Francisco Chronicle reporter Carolyn Said, communication firm director Matthew Benson 
faulted the company for “not communicating more proactively early on,” and for the failure of 
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Toyota management to quickly “step up.”
93
 In an essay for The Wall Street Journal, Jeff 
Kingston, director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan, characterized Toyoda as being 
“MIA for two weeks,” and faulted the company’s for its “slow initial response.”
94
 According to 
Hitotsubashi University business professor Sherman Abe, Toyota failed to be as assertive as 
needed, in terms of assuring consumers that the immediate problem was being addressed. 
Additionally, Japanese finance professor Yukio Noguchi observed that the crisis showed that 
Toyota was not “very good at communicating with its customers.”
95
 James Wiseman, the U.S. 
Toyota spokesperson, acknowledged that “we could have communicated better as a company.”
96
  
However he also assured reporters that, “we have taken significant steps to address these 
issues.”
97
 Additionally, James Lentz, president of Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., observed that 
Toyota President Akio Toyoda and other Japan-based company executives “had a sense of just 
how stirred up things were in the U.S.”
98
 So the company recognized that neither it nor its 
president had communicated in a manner which would have resonated with its American 
customers and perhaps might have limited the damage to its image.  
However, as promised by Wisemen, steps were taken to overcome audience perceptions 
of Toyota’s communication behaviors as non-responsive and un-caring. First, Akio Toyoda, 
president of Toyota, characterized his experience of testifying on Capitol Hill as “a turning 
point.”
99
 Moreover, he vowed to “return to the Toyota Way,”
100
 which he defined as “core 
principles,” of “respect for people and continuous improvement.”
101
 Viewed in this way, the 
Toyota Way constituted a constraint on Akio Toyoda and his company’s rhetoric during the 
recall. Clearly, the core values of the Toyota Way constitute a cultural expectation within the 
company, and thus returning to these core values was viewed as an integral part of overcoming 
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audience perceptions that Toyota had not lived up to standards of being a credible corporate 
citizen.  
Some media experts expressed optimism about Toyota’s eventual turnaround. In 
comparing Toyota’s crisis with Tiger Wood’s crisis, Rick Newman argued that both would 
mount “an impressive comeback,” and predicted that Toyota would “come up with new ways to 
win over skeptical customers.”
102
 According to Gita Johar, Matthias Birk, and Sabine Elinwiller, 
the keys to restoring Toyota’s image were “various activities of communication and action.”
103
 
Yet Matthew Seeger cautioned that the “intercultural barriers create an additional set of serious 
challenges.”
104
 Thus, because of the influence of both American and Japanese communicative 
culture, traditional discursive approaches to apologia with the emphasis on what Ware and 
Linkugel argued was the “public speech of self-defense” may not fully illuminate the nature of 
Toyota’s rhetoric during the recent recall crisis. What is needed is a way to explain how the 
company’s rhetoric functioned to overcome the cultural constraints, move it back to its core 
values as expressed in the Toyota Way, and thus reestablish trust with its American customers. 
Study Methodology, Rhetorical Artifacts and Chapter Progression 
In order to illuminate how Toyota’s crisis rhetoric functioned to overcome constraints 
and reestablished trust with its American customers, this study uses a broad inductive approach 
and a range of artifacts for analysis. In the following sections I preview the artifacts for analysis, 
and describe what my inductive approach will entail. The chapter concludes I end with a preview 
of how the study will unfold. 
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Rhetorical artifacts for study 
 I have selected both print and video artifacts. My rationale for choosing these artifacts is that 
Toyota was conducting a multi-media atonement campaign that, in the words of former Procter 
& Gamble Marketing Chief Jim Stengel, encompassed “a massive one-on-one campaign.”
105
 
Moreover, the selected artifacts illustrate Toyota’s efforts to create an inclusive, customer-
centered narrative or what Chris Gidez characterizes as “the compelling story,” in which the 
company tells its audience that “they’ve got the fix, they have the means to maintain or rebuild 
that trust.”
106
 Thus, Toyota’s compelling story is spun out in both print and video artifacts. 
The print artifacts consist of notices, letters, and editorials. In chronological order these 
documents are: “A Temporary Pause,” dated January 21,2010;  the ”Open Letter to Toyota 
Customers” letter dated February 2, 2010, and  “There’s Been A Lot of Talk About The Recall,” 
on February 5, 2010. These print announcements were followed by editorials written by Toyota 
President, Akio Toyoda. The editorials appeared in the February 9, 2010 issue of the Washington 
Post and February 23, 2010 issue of The Wall Street Journal.  
The second set of artifacts consists of video ads that ran in February of 2010. These ads, 
which premiered during the first day of the 2010 Winter Olympics, appeared on television and 
were posted on You Tube. The You Tube videos constitute what senior brand strategist 
Christopher Baccus contended was “one of the most effective mechanisms” used by Toyota 
“thus far.”
107
 The videos selected for analysis included “Toyota Commitment,” “Toyota 
Restore,” “Customer Perceptions on Toyota,” “Dealer Perspective on Toyota,” and finally, 
“Toyota Members Discuss the Toyota Recall.” All of these videos are available on the Toyota 
Website. The challenge of this study then is to find the compelling, personalized, narrative 
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strategies that Toyota used to overcome cultural constraints, return to its core values as embodied 
by the Toyota Way, reestablish trust with their customers and thus repair its image. 
Using an inductive approach for the study of Toyota’s apologia 
According to rhetorical critic Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, the “academic critic explores and 
analyzes whatever acts will aid in explaining the essential processes of human symbolization.”
108
 
Thus, the critic moves beyond the message itself to discover what deeper symbolic processes are 
at work within the message. In order to facilitate exploration and explanation of Toyota’s 
strategic responses to the recall crisis, this study uses an inductive approach guided by a broad-
based analysis scheme. Guide is the key word here for it is not the researcher’s intent to impose 
an interpretation on the study artifacts but rather to let the data emerge from the artifacts, 
illuminate the deeper symbolic processes at work and ultimately lead to a theoretical explanation.  
The analytic process is a three-fold process developed initially by Kohrs-Campbell and 
later refined by Kohrs-Campbell and her students.
 109
  The final stage, interpretation, takes into 
consideration the intrinsic analysis of the text itself and the extrinsic analysis of the contextual 
factors. In terms of the present study, the interpretive stage involves analyzing the selected 
Toyota artifacts for strategies and themes that will be compared to the previously explained 
existing theories of apologia in order to illuminate possible explanations for Toyota’s successful 
rhetoric. Second, I draw on available data regarding audience reaction as the crisis unfolded, 
crystalized and was finally resolved in order to make judgments about the efficacy of various 
descriptions of themes and strategies in along with consideration of audience reaction. Third, I 
will develop a theory-based description of the trajectory of Toyota’s crisis apologia as it 
struggled with its initial response, found its footing with its subsequent responses and finally 
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emerged from the crisis with a renewed congruency of trust with its customers and a renewed 
commitment to the Toyota Way. 
Progression of study chapters 
In chapter two I explore the history of Toyota Motor Corporation and how investor-
focused Western business practices introduced in the mid 1990’s weakened the foundational 
roots of the company and created the exigence for the recall crisis. This is followed by an 
exploration of the relationship of Shinto and the Toyota Way, as the foundational roots of 
Toyota. In chapter three I present a theory-based approach to apologia as a way of explaining 
how the embattled car maker could work towards reestablishing trust in its brands with its 
customers. Chapter four constitutes an analysis of this rhetorical approach in terms of the 
inception of the crisis, the crisis, and the resolution of the crisis respectively. This analysis will 
not only include the rhetorical responses but the specific acts that Toyota took regarding the 
recall of cars, how it worked with its dealerships and the supplier of the faulty accelerator pedals, 
and finally, what the automaker did to fully address the repair issues so that further reports of 
misbehaving vehicles ceased. Finally, chapter five explores the possible implications of the 
study. 
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Chapter 2: 
History of the Crisis & the Toyota Way   
It is my contention that Toyota’s recall crisis and initial poor communicative 
response was the result of Westernized business practices that promoted myopic, 
investor-minded, profit-driven actions. These practices took hold over a roughly 14-year-
period under three company presidents who were not members of the Toyoda family. 
These leaders introduced Western business practices that produced rampant growth but 
threatened the quality-centered, customer-focused culture of the company, as exemplified 
by the Toyota Way. I contend that these practices threatened the Toyota Way, initially 
limiting the effectiveness of the company’s apologia. However, as I will show, the 
company turned towards its Shinto roots in order to effectively atone for its actions to its 
American customers.  
In the following sections I present a brief history of Toyota Motor Company and 
the Toyoda family which guided the company for over thirty years. Next, I explain how 
Toyota Motor Company passed out of the hands of the Toyoda Family members to 
executives focused on promoting American business practices. It was practices focused 
on growth and profits that created the exigence for the recall crisis. Finally, in the third 
and fourth sections I present concepts associated with Japanese Shinto which Robert 
Carter has argued is “the most significant source of Japanese ethics,” and I show how 
Shinto informs the Toyota Way. 
History of Toyota Motor Corporation and the Inception of the Recall Crisis 
It is impossible to write of the Toyota Motor Corporation without drawing the Toyoda 
family into the discussion. In the following sections I trace the founding of the company and the 
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powerful philosophical influence that the Toyoda family brought to bear on the company for 30 
years. Second, in the subsequent section, the recent history of the company illuminates possible 
reasons why the recall crisis of 2010 drove Toyota off the road. The inception of the crisis 
suggests that when powerful non-family members assumed control of the company, a culture 
based on continuous learning and respect for people as integral forces for producing quality cars 
was sublimated by a focus on profit and growth. 
A brief history of Toyota and Toyoda  
The Toyota Motor Company grew out of a loom company founded by Sakichi Toyoda in 
1926. Eventually Toyoda looms became the preeminent product of their type and, in 1929, 
Toyoda sent his son, Kiichiro, to England to negotiate and subsequently sell the design patent 
rights for the loom to an English loom maker. Moreover, Kiichiro was also sent on to the United 
States to study automobile development and production. With part of the resulting profits from 
the sale of the loom patent, Sakichi Toyoda tasked Kiichiro to develop what would become 
Toyota Motor Company.  
Between the company’s establishment in 1937 and the crisis of 2010, six of Toyota’s 11 
presidents, including current President Akio Toyoda, have been Toyoda family members.
1
 
Jeffrey Liker argues that Toyoda family members all brought a similar philosophy to the 
company. Namely, according to Liker, “they all learned to get their hands dirty, learned the spirit 
of innovation, and understood the values of the company in contributing to society.” 
2
 But the 
philosophy of doing well for society through hard work and innovation was not simply a mind-
set. Kiichiro and his brother-in-law, Risaburo, compiled the Five Principles of Toyoda, thus 
setting the cultural tone that guided the Toyota Motor Company for almost 60 years. In this study 
I consider culture to be the philosophical roots that create a sense of being for Toyota as reflected 
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in the Toyota Way and through the leadership of the Toyoda family.
3
 Although there were 
periods in which the company periodically passed out of the Toyoda family, those leaders were 
either Toyoda family by marriage or had worked closely with the family in the fledging days of 
the loom and car businesses.
4
 
It was under Eiji Toyoda, who served as president from 1967 to 1982 that Toyota grew 
and prospered.
5
  In his term, Eiji worked to establish the Toyota Foundation aimed at funding 
research, as well as the Toyota Technical Institute whose goal was to educate “young adults 
burning with a desire to learn.” 
6
 Upon Eiji Toyoda’s retirement in 1982, the company came 
under the leadership of Shoichiro Toyoda, Kiichiro’s eldest son, who oversaw the establishment 
of the Guiding Principles of Toyota, as well as the establishment of the Toyota Earth Charter, 
which is based on the Guiding Principles.
7
  Thus, even as Toyota Motor Corporation grew and 
prospered, it never lost sight of the importance of learning or of its place in contributing to the 
larger society. 
However, in the early 1990s a series of events landed the company in the hands of non-
family members. In 1992, Shoichiro was succeeded by his younger brother, Tatsuro, who only 
served three years before stepping down due to illness in February of 1995. Five months later, 
Toyota went outside the Toyoda family and tapped Hiroshi Okuda for the top job.”
8
  For the first 
time in 27 years, Toyota Motor Company was in the hands of non-family members and it would 
remain that way until Akio Toyoda was put in the driver’s seat in early 2009. Under these new 
leaders the company’s focus shifted from people, learning, and quality to profits and growth. 
How Toyota lost its way 
Toyota’s fall from automotive grace and its subsequent poor communication practices in 
the early days of the 2010 crisis were the result of a shift in culture that transpired between 1995 
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and 2009. The shift occurred under three financially-focused non-Toyoda family members and 
resulted in what Peter Brown characterized as a company in which “the ethic changed.”
9
 Part of 
the ethical shift started under Hiroshi Okuda, who was selected as president in 1995. According 
to Hans Greimel of Automotive News, Okuda was an “independent minded, and aggressive,” 
leader who “aspired toward a more Western-style financially driven company.”
10
  Upon being 
selected to lead Toyota, Okuda promised that his up-coming tenure would be one in which he 
would “make product planning and development more flexible, raise domestic market share and 
increase the pace of overseas operations.”
11
 Okuda made good on those promises. Furthermore, 
according to Bloomberg Businessweek reporters Alan Ohnsman, Jeff Green, and Kae Inoue, 
Okuda and his team embarked on “one of the most aggressive overseas expansion in automotive 
history.”
12
  Between 1995 and the end of 2009, the number of overseas plants reached 50, nearly 
doubling previous Toyota plants outside Japan.
13
 Along with increased production came a new 
array of Toyota designs including “the boxy Scion xB to the one-ton Tundra pickup [and] the 
hybrid Prius.”
14
  
Perhaps Okuda’s biggest move was to list the company on the New York Stock Exchange 
in 1999. Peter Brown maintained that this move created a change in Toyota’s learning culture in 
which most workers “tried to do things a tad better every day,” which reinforced the ethic of 
“building bullet-proof vehicles that offered value to buyers.”
15
  Brown argued that because “the 
NYSE rewards only growth,” Toyota’s culture shifted from one focused on meeting the needs of 
its customers in terms of unsurpassed quality, to a culture where investor interests predominated
 
.
16
  So within a short five - to - seven - year period, the profit bug had begun to, in effect, alter 
the DNA of the company.  
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Toyota’s focus on investor interests increased in 2002 when Okuda’s successor, Fujio 
Cho, also a family outsider, announced the ambitious “Global 1,” program with a very public 
vow to increase the company’s global market share from 10.7 percent to 15 percent. 
17
  The 
result of “Global 15” would have seen Toyota catch and surpass then number – one - ranked 
General Motors; but it came at a price: Toyota would have to grow by 50 percent.
18
 This move 
weakened the company’s reputation for quality in terms of products and the innovative drive for 
learning that had long been foundational to the Toyota Way.   
The “Global 15” initiative had deleterious effects on the quality of Toyota’s vehicles. In 
an editorial for Advertising Age, Ken Wheaton argued that quality suffered as the company 
“became fixated on growth.”
19
 Aida Sevilla Mendoza echoed this assessment, arguing that the 
company slid into the ditch over a period of several years as non-family CEOs “sacrificed quality 
for faster growth and fatter margins.”
20
  The effects of the growth-focused policies became 
apparent when Toyota began recalling vehicles at much higher rates than previously in its 
history. For example, the company had recalled 8,379 vehicles in 2000, garnering a reputation 
for have “the fewest recalls among the six largest players in the U.S. auto market.”
21
 However, 
by 2005 Toyota recalled more than 2.3 million vehicles, and in 2007 the company settled a class-
action lawsuit filed by customers’ complaints over a build-up of oil sludge in vehicles’ engines.
22
  
 The concern about quality as related to safety and training was evident within Toyota’s 
rank-and-file. In 2006, Tadao Wakasuki and other long-time Toyota employees sent a two-page 
memo to Toyota President Katsuaki Watanabe.
23
  Wakasuki charged that safety considerations 
were being sacrificed by Toyota in pursuit of profit. According to Times of London reporter, Leo 
Lewis, Wakasuki and his colleagues charged that “cost-cutting and speed had become the 
dominant ethos at the expense of experience and thoroughness.”
24
 Moreover, "top to toe" safety 
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checks were no longer conducted on 100 per cent of cars.”
25
  In another incident, related to 
safety, the 2006 Camry was found to have a headliner that would catch fire because the supplier, 
Toyota Boshoku, was under pressure to cut cost.
26
   
The Wakasuki memo also addressed the weakened state of people development within 
the company.  According to Morgan O’Rourke, the quality of Toyota vehicles was a direct result 
of the company’s practice of continuous improvement. When Toyota “rapidly expanded over the 
last decade,” O’Rourke observed that “this devotion to quality seems to have been left behind.”
27
 
Toyota’s culture, that had long honored and observed continuous learning as an integral part of 
quality, was withering as a result of the profit-growth focused business practices. Wakasuki and 
his colleagues lamented “the general decline of craftsmanship at Japan's most famous 
manufacturing company.”
28
 Technology Professor Bill Fischer also linked the weakened learning 
culture with the focus on market growth. Writing in the March 12, 2010, issue of The Edge,  
Fischer argued that Toyota’s “tacit knowledge,” which had been passed from generation to 
generation of Toyota employees, simply could not be transmitted within the company’s growth 
arena which encompassed “new product areas in new geographic markets with new factory 
settings.”
29
 “Toyota,” asserted Fischer, “failed in that while pursuing growth, it neglected to pay 
attention to things that it already knew as an organization (sic).”
30
 In other words, the demand of 
expanding the market out-paced the learning curve of Toyota employees.  
Eventually, Toyota’s rapid financial expansion fell victim to a larger world-wide 
financial crisis. In 2008, there was a global economic crisis triggered by the meltdown in the 
United States subprime mortgage crisis, and this too adversely affected Toyota. In early 2009 the 
company reported that for the first time in 37 years of business, Toyota was facing operating 
losses two years in a row.
31
 Takamitsu Saito, deputy economics news editor for The Daily 
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Yomiuri, asserted that “one reason for the deterioration is that the firm’s policy of rapid 
expansion has backfired.”
32
 Saito also noted that Toyota was responding to the crisis by, in part, 
“drastically cutting costs.” 
33
 However, Saito also cautioned that such a move could further 
damage the company if it “cut costs in areas necessary for maintaining quality.”
34
   
Thus, quality considerations coupled with profit losses were elements that Akio Toyoda 
inherited when he climbed into the driver’s seat as president of Toyota Motor Corporation in 
June of 2009.  With the company once again in the hands of the founding family, Akio Toyoda 
made it clear that Toyota Motor Corporation would return to the Toyota Way. First, Toyoda 
openly criticized and characterized the company’s focus on growth as being “growth that is 
larger than the size of the company.”
35
  Toyoda also vowed that he would return the focus of the 
company to one in which “customers and the rank-and-file,” would be put first.
36
 This followed 
earlier declarations by the new president that the company should adopt a new motto: “Getting 
back to where it started.” 
37
 Finally, in October of 2009, Toyoda abandoned the 15 percent global 
market share goal because, according to a Toyota executive, “It is not the Toyota Way to aim for 
15 percent or 10 percent.”
38
 Clearly, Akio Toyoda realized that his company needed life-support 
if it were to return to a place of cultural health. His comments demonstrate that he knew that 
quality depended on returning to the Toyota Way, in which there was a customer-first focus 
instead of a focus on growth and profits.  
When the recall happened, Toyota had to atone for its lack of quality that was the result 
of the Western style business practices that had undermined the Toyota Way. In order to return 
to the Toyota Way, the company turned to the curative power of the Eastern based philosophy, 
Shinto, in order to effectively atone for its actions. Shinto not only is deeply ingrained in 
Japanese culture but also informs the Toyota Way. 
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Shinto as the Way of Nature & the Toyota Way 
Although other Eastern religions such as Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, and Confucianism 
are practiced in Japan, Floyd Hiatt Ross wrote that Shinto is not merely influential but constitutes 
for the Japanese, “the most authentic expression of their basic attitude towards life.”
39
 Asian 
scholar Thomas Kasulis echoed this argument noting that Shinto’s “basic values and patterns 
have filtered into Japanese culture as a part of tradition.”
40
 As such, Kasulis argued, Shinto is 
best conceptualized as a sort of spirituality that is “reflected off or refracted through the most 
mundane events.” 
41
 Because of its pervasiveness within Japanese culture, Shinto provides a 
perspective on the Toyota Way. Towards that end, I begin with an exploration of Shinto as a 
worldview and its relation to living an ethical life through seven distinct virtues.  
The Shinto Worldview: Walking the way of nature 
At the heart of Shinto is a conviction that the world, including humans, exists in a 
dynamic interdependent relationship. Through this interdependence entities achieve 
completeness through each other. 
42
  Such a perspective is different from the Western conception 
of relationship as an external relationship between two entities.  
Central to the dynamism of interrelatedness are musubi and kami. According to James 
Boyd and Ron Williams, musubi is a “generative, creative force,” 
43
  a “dynamic, evolutionary 
power which produces, fecundates, brews, and ferments.”
44
  Inherent in the notion of production 
and fermentation is another connotation of musubi which, Boyd and Williams argued, carries 
“connotations of ‘combination,’ ‘joining,’ and ‘binding together.”
45
 In this sense, musubi is akin 
to the Force in Star Wars: It surrounds life, flows through life, and binds life together.  
41 
 
If musubi is a generative force, bubbling with potentiality, then kami is musubi incarnate. 
Kami is a particularly hard concept to define in the Western sense, but Shinto scholars are 
adamant that kami is not “god,” or “God,” in the Western sense.
46
 As opposed to Western 
concepts of a transcendent, omnipotent God, Robert Carter observed that kami is “immanent in 
the world,” and as such kami is experienced as “mystery, superior quality and the awesome.”
47
 
Thus, one experiences kami in glorious sunsets, a brilliant scholar, a raging storm, or a category-
five tornado. As such examples illustrate, there is no clear-cut delineation between good and evil 
within Shinto. According to Floyd Hiatt Ross, “bad,” kami is simply viewed as “violent or 
troublesome,” while good kami “specialize in making things work out for the best.”
48
 Moreover, 
even when kami is troublesome or violent there lies within it the potential (musubi) for 
productivity in that out of bad will come good. Thus, in the Shinto worldview people have the 
ability to harness musubi towards greater creative ends and social harmony. 
Musubi and kami are not only crucial to understanding Shinto as a worldview, but also 
for understanding ethics of behavior as manifested through communication. Fundamental to 
Shinto ethics is the conviction that there is a “way of nature” the kami-no-michi, “according to 
which men should walk.”
49
  At its heart kami-no-michi is the way towards goodness that involves 
“personal happiness, harmony of self-integration, growth, and creative development and 
expression (transformation), as well as familial, communal, and the wider social happiness, 
harmony or integration, growth, and creative development.”
50
  The process of walking in the way 
of nature involves an on-going cultivation of several virtues in order to realize purity or harai.  
The first virtue associated with a person’s path towards excellence as part of society is 
inextricably tied to michi, which, according to Robert Carter, is the equivalent of character or 
integrity. A person of michi, a person of integrity, is one who seeks the ideal path, through a life 
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exemplified by harmony, or wa, growth, and personal development infused with creativity. The 
implication of growth and development is that it demands of those walking the path that they 
remain ready and willing to ‘adapt to new demands while at the same time staying centered, 
balanced, and agile.”
51
 Michi then is concerned with a person’s growth as part of life rather than 
growth as an outcome. 
A person of michi also strives to be a person of makoto or sincerity. Makoto may be the 
most important of the virtues for it is makoto that lies at the heart of social interactions and 
creates wa (harmony). Robert Carter asserted as much, arguing that across the many religious 
traditions observed in Japan, including Shinto, “sincerity is always front and center.” 
52
 Kasulis, 
adds to this definition  noting that makoto also means ”truth” and “genuineness.”
53
  Rhetorically, 
makoto is significant because one enacts makoto through the “careful avoidance of error in word 
or deed.”
54
 This means that when action does not follow contrition then the community does not 
view the public figure or organization as being trustworthy. However, when words become 
deeds, then one is perceived by the community as being trustworthy. Moreover, through sincerity 
and harmony there emerges the third virtue, that of akaki or cheerfulness. 
Finally, michi, makoto, and akaki are bound up with kensha or “a spirit of 
thankfulness.”
55
 Kensha is manifested by “sincere effort, hard work, and steadfastness.”
56
  When 
given spontaneously and from the heart, Kensha becomes kenshin. Given the stress on communal 
harmony or wa, kenshin can be characterized as “devotion to the common interest.” Hence, the 
path of the virtuous may be summed up as one that encourages  people to develop their potential 
(musubi), by following exemplars of virtuous living (kami) in such a way that integrity, sincerity, 
cheerfulness, and the spirit of giving one’s best is reflected in one’s words and deeds.  
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The Toyota Way: Reflections of Shinto 
Within a Shinto perspective, organizations such as Toyota are responsible for pursuing a 
virtuous corporate life that contributes to society and is reflected in the words and deeds of the 
company. In turn, words and deeds are interpreted by an audience, especially a Western one, as a 
positive indicator of the company’s congruency with the values of the society in which the 
company operates. In other words, the degree to which makoto as sincere words is congruent 
with makoto as sincere actions influences whether or not the organization is viewed as being 
worthy of society’s trust.   
Trust lies at the root of Toyota’s recall. Washington Post reporter Blaine Harden 
characterized the Toyota Way as “a cult of quality,” and when Toyota strayed from its path, the 
result, according to Noreen O’Leary, were disillusioned Toyota owners who had brought their 
vehicles for “a brand promise that has let them down and they’re feeling betrayed.”
57
  Finally, 
Matthew DeBord noted that “Toyota doesn’t just build cars and trucks. It creates a state of mind, 
and that state of mind enables absolute trust in Toyota.”
58
 Clearly, the Toyota Way was viewed 
by audiences as being at the heart of Toyota quality and hence the trust that Toyota owners 
placed in the Toyota brand. But it was not just external audiences with whom the trust was 
violated. Because the Toyota Way, like Shinto, perceives relationships as being interdependent, 
the actions of the individual are as much a contributor to the audience’s perception of quality and 
hence trust as the corporate persona of the company itself. Thus, in order to understand why 
Toyota had to atone for violating its core values, this section explores the relationship between 
Shinto and the Toyota Way. 
The foundational principles of the Toyota Way were first articulated by the founder of the 
company, Sakichi Toyoda and are known as “Five Main Principles of Toyoda.”
59
 These five 
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principles reflect how a person of michi, a person of integrity, should walk in the way of nature 
as exemplified by the Toyota Way and its twin pillars of “respect for people,” and “continuous 
learning.” For example, according to the first principle, employees demonstrate their 
commitment to walk in the Toyota Way by observing the principle to “always be faithful to your 
duties, thereby contributing to the company and to the overall good.”
60
 Employees who faithfully 
undertakes their job are manifesting “sincere effort, hard work, and steadfastness,” the hallmarks 
of kensha.
61
  Additionally, sincere dedication to one’s duties is bound to, influences, and 
ultimately achieves completeness by contributing to the overall good because, as Robert Carter 
maintains, in the Shinto worldview, “we are always in relationship,” with the world.
62
  
 The second and third principles, although articulated separately, are interdependent and 
therefore complete each other. The second principle advises that one should “always be studious 
and creative, striving to stay ahead of the times,” while the third principle states that one should 
“be practical and avoid frivolousness.” In Shinto, creativity is the generative force or musubi, but 
within the five principles the raw potential of creativity must be tempered with studiousness and 
practicality. Moreover, being practical and studious reflects the ability to stay centered and 
balanced. The capacity for centeredness and balance allows the Toyota employee to stay agile 
and take on new challenges, which is how one “stays ahead of the times.” In observing principles 
two and three, the Toyota employee is honoring the pillar of continuous learning.  
Continuous learning, or kaizen, is the backbone for Toyota’s production philosophy as 
typified by the Toyota Production System (TPS). According to author Jeffrey Liker, Professor of 
Industrial and Operations Engineering at the University of Michigan, the Toyota Way undergirds 
TPS in that kaizen can only be realized through group processes in which production processes 
are scrutinized for possible improvement based on data collection, problem solving and a sense 
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of self-management.
63
 In terms of Shinto ethics, the backbone for the success or failure of these 
group-driven production processes is makoto. Recalling that the enactment of makoto is partially 
fulfilled when one is sincere in one’s deeds, or actions, then sincerity, in terms of self-
management, becomes critical to the Toyota Way. For example, quality is dependent on the 
sincere actions of team members to scrutinize data and engage in problem solving towards a 
greater goal of improvement. 
In contrast to principles two and three with their emphasis on learning and perfecting 
processes, Toyoda’s fourth principle addresses how relationships influence the work 
environment. Toyoda advises the employee to “always strive to build a homelike atmosphere at 
work that is warm and friendly.”
64
 This is not what one would expect to find in a set of present-
day corporate principles. However, warmth and friendliness contribute to and are part of kami-
no-michi and therefore contribute to the sphere of social happiness that, Robert Carter argued, 
involves the familial.
65
 Moreover, it is Carter’s contention that “cheerfulness and sincerity are 
basic expressions of one’s attitudes towards others, towards the world and one’s place in it.”
66
 
Arguably, a good work environment plays a vital role in staying centered, focused and dedicated 
to one’s duties. 
Finally, the fifth principle serves to complete the circle in that the theme of harmony, 
articulated in the first principle as contributing to the “overall good,” is reiterated again as the 
employee is encouraged to “Always have respect for spiritual matters, and remember to be 
grateful at all times.”
67
 Again, it is important to note that within Japanese culture to respect 
spiritual matters is not a dictate to worship in a particular way, but rather expresses an attitude in 
which there is a realization that the whole world is sacred because of the immanent presence of 
kami. Because the potential to produce well lies within each person, it makes sense to remember 
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to be thankful for the ability to do well; it is only natural to demonstrate kensha, the “spirit of 
thankfulness.”
68
  
The “Five Principles of Toyoda” constitutes the ideological foundations of Toyota. 
Internally, the principles are grounded in Shinto, and thus the Toyota Way is the kami-no-michi 
of company employees. In 1992, Toyota established its “Guiding Principles” that reflect the 
kami-no-michi of the company in the wider world. While these seven principles do not mirror the 
“Five Principles of Toyoda,” they do honor the pillars of “respect for people,” and “continuous 
learning,” and thus they also reflect Shinto themes and ethics. For example, the theme of growth 
is evident in the declarations that Toyota will ”work with business partners in research and 
manufacture to achieve stable, long-term growth and mutual benefits, while keeping ourselves 
open to new partnerships,” as well as pursuing growth through harmony with the global 
community via innovative management.”
69
  The pairing of musubi as creative potential and 
creativity tempered by continuous learning is not only reflected in management innovation but 
also in principles that speak to the company’s promise to “create and develop advanced 
technologies,” and to foster a culture “that enhances both individual creativity and the value of 
teamwork.” 
70
 Finally, respect for people is evident throughout the seven principles. For 
example, Toyota recognizes that achieving harmony, or wa in the wider world is dependent on 
the company’s ability to “respect the culture and customs of every nation,” as well as 
“undertak[ing] open and fair business activities to be a good corporate citizen of the world.” 
71
 
Moreover, the Guiding Principles are reflective of Shinto’s most important virtue: makoto. 
Explicitly, Toyota recognizes the importance of “honoring mutual trust and respect between 
labor and management.”
72
 Because Shinto views all aspects of the world as existing in a dynamic 
reciprocal relationship, it make sense that there can be no harmony with business partners, 
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customers, and other nations if there is no harmony within the organization itself. Thus, in 
declaring trust and respect between management and labor, Toyota strives to be a company of 
makoto, or sincerity. Recalling Robert Carter’s assertion that sincerity is “always front and 
center,” as the active indicator of the trustworthiness of an individual, or in this case, the 
company, then the seven “Guiding Principles” and the “Five Principles of Toyoda,” are those 
active indicators. 
Taken together, the ancestral precepts of Sakachi Toyoda and the modern day guiding 
principles constitute the core values of Toyota Motor Company which are rooted in Shinto. A 
final example of the influence of Shinto on the Toyota Way is that Toyota is one of several 
Japanese corporations that have their own Shinto shrines.
73
  This is not an unusual occurrence.  
Japanese scholar Naofusa Hiari observed that one function of the Shinto shrine is that it 
constitutes the “spiritual homeland of the community.”
74
 Company shrines then are an explicit 
symbol of the importance of the familial and communal goodness that contribute to the ‘way of 
nature.”  
Toyota’s company shrine, The Toyooki Shrine, was built in 1925 when the company first 
went into business. According to Honda Soichiro, each year on the “founding day,” in January, 
Toyota executives and managers gather to “pray for the prosperity and safety of Toyota” in a 
ritual that not only honors the founding of the company but also “promotes the unity and 
harmony of the whole company.”
75
 Moreover, each fall since the mid 1980’s Toyota executives 
have undertaken a three hour pilgrimage of sorts, driving the latest Toyota models from the 
company headquarters in Nagoya to the Ise Grand Shrine in order to “call down the blessings of 
the gods” for the coming car sales season.
76
 The establishment of a company shrine and the 
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yearly vehicle pilgrimage demonstrate Toyota’s explicit and public recognition of Shinto as 
being foundational to the Toyota Way 
How Western practices violated Shinto 
 As I argued earlier, changes in Toyota’s business practices radically changed the culture 
of the company from one that was intent on respecting people and encouraging on-going 
learning, to one in which profit and growth drove the company’s actions. The shift away from 
people and learning also marked a move away from Shinto principles. For example, Shinto holds 
that because the virtues of walking the way of nature are interrelated, when one virtue is 
downplayed or ignored, the other virtues are similarly affected. Hence, when the company failed 
to honor the virtue of michi, which moves one to live a life of integrity marked by creative 
growth and concern for the greater good of society, makoto, or sincerity was also jeopardized.  
Clearly, during the 14 years during which Hiroshi Okuda, Fuijo, and Katsuaki Watanabe 
ran the company, sincerity was questionable. When the company expanded faster than it could 
train its workforce, pushed economy to the point that suppliers created sub-par parts, and ignored 
the sage advice of its senior line workers, quality ultimately suffered. Because Toyota quality 
provided a sense of trust between the company and its consumers, mokoto suffered. In short, 
Toyota was not viewed as being trustworthy. In moving away from the Toyota Way, the 
company left its path of kami-no-michi, where individual creativity and growth were viewed as 
contributing to the greater social good and not just to the bottom line. Thus, in order to regain the 
Toyota Way the company had to find a rhetorical response that would explicitly address the 
expectations of the American Toyota audience and regain the trust of that audience.  
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Chapter 3:  
The Rhetoric of Atonement 
 
Organizational crises demand that embattled organizations respond with messages that 
address the perceived wrong-doings and repair the organization’s image. To this end 
organizational apologia includes a repertoire of strategic responses that an organization can 
muster to address the crisis. However, there are instances when the evidence of wrongdoing is so 
overwhelming that denying or justifying actions, attempting to transcend the situation or 
bolstering individual or organizational values would be perceived as disingenuous and perhaps 
hypocritical.
1
 I contend that poorly managed product recalls constitute one of those instances.  
For example, in their study of Firestone’s apologia during the 2000 tire recall, Blaney, 
Benoit, and Brazeal argued that Firestone’s use of corrective action, bolstering, and blame-
shifting was ineffective. These authors contend that Firestone’s apologia amounted to messages 
that were perceived as, “There is nothing wrong with our product and we are recalling it.”
2
 
Clearly, such a message could be perceived as both disingenuous and hypocritical by consumers 
caught up in the recall. As Dirk Gibson has argued, “socially responsible corporations are deeply 
concerned with the safety and well-being of their product purchasers.”
3
 Elsewhere, Robert 
Rowland and Angela Jerome have noted that expressing concern for the victims of a crisis is an 
extension of the image maintenance strategy of demonstrating that an organization is both 
“caring and decent.” 
4
 Thus, when an organization fails to respond in a timely and compassionate 
manner to a recall, it sends a message that, in effect, tells the audience that the organization is 
neither concerned with nor cares about the audience’s perceptions of what is considered safe.  
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Therefore, what is needed in cases where the evidence of wrongdoing is so overwhelming that 
denying or justifying actions, attempting to transcend the situation or bolstering individual or 
organizational values would be perceived as disingenuous and perhaps hypocritical, is a different 
kind of apologia. Joy Koesten and Robert Rowland contend that the appropriate rhetorical 
response is one of atonement. 
 In this chapter I build a case for why atonement was the appropriate response for 
Toyota’s communication to its customers and why atonement rhetoric provided a way for the 
company to return to the Toyota Way. First, I introduce Koesten and Rowland’s conception of 
atonement rhetoric, how it functions and why it best addresses situations in which contrition is 
demanded.  Next, I argue for a rhetoric of atonement as the best strategic response for addressing 
the Toyota communication crisis. This section highlights atonement’s rhetorical strength in 
addressing the cultural communicative constraints faced by Toyota as well as how atonement 
provided a way for the company to atone for its failure to act in an ethical manner as prescribed 
by the Toyota Way. 
Atonement Rhetoric as Ritual Response 
In their argument for atonement rhetoric Koesten and Rowland contend that within those 
instances that preclude the use of apologia strategies of denial, justification, transcendence, or 
bolstering, only a “formal act of contrition,” the acceptance of responsibility coupled with 
“words and actions indicating genuine remorse and suffering for committing the sin, “will 
suffice.
5
 As a formal act of contrition, atonement constitutes what Shlomo Deshen defines as a 
“rite of transition.”
6
 In other words, atonement is a ritualized response. 
Rituals are significant events to the life of a community because they are both social and 
collective.
7
 Deshen maintains that rituals “constitute major stages in the life of the individual and 
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the human group.”
8
 Moreover, rituals are often liminal events in which the day-to-day acts of the 
individual and community are set aside or transcended in order to enter into what Deshen argues 
is “wise, considered and detached contemplation on the nature of society.”
9
 As sometimes 
transcendent events, rituals have clearly delineated beginnings and endings that mark them as 
"distinct events in the flow of social activity."
10
 Within the ritual itself are distinctive acts that 
that are recognized by members of the same culture and so they serve as a form of 
identification.
11
 In the case of atonement the crucial acts that create identification and serve other 
functions are repentance, prayer, and charity.
12
   
These three ritual acts provide a way for an organization to assuage guilt; they fulfill 
what Kenneth Burke defined a purgative- redemptive function. Through an admission of guilt, 
the offending organization undergoes a rebirth, or a “process of socialization,” through which the 
organization is redeemed in the eyes of the society.
13
 Moreover, as a rhetorical response, the 
three acts of atonement constitute a discursive and public act. Through atonement as a rhetorical 
rite of transition responding to a crisis, the organization demonstrates that it has undergone a 
change of attitude and accepts responsibility for its sins by fixing the relationships ruptured by its 
harmful acts.  In order to understand how atonement functions, a more in-depth exploration of 
repentance, prayer, and charity is called for. 
The significance of repentance in the atonement response 
The first step on the path of atonement is repentance, or admitting to the sinful act, “in an 
attempt to gain forgiveness and long-term image restoration.”
14
 In the context of a public figure 
or organization seeking forgiveness through atonement, repentance means that the speaker must 
“acknowledge wrongdoing and ask for forgiveness.”
15
 For example, in his apology to the 
families and survivors of the Cold War Tuskegee syphilis study, President Bill Clinton explicitly 
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acknowledged the clandestine and “deceptive” nature of the experiments as well as offering an 
explicit apology.
16
 However, in a subsequent study of atonement, Angela Jerome argued that 
successful atonement does not always involve the offending party explicitly asking for 
forgiveness. According to Jerome, “the rhetor must acknowledge the wrongdoing and create the 
public perception [my emphasis] that forgiveness was sought and/or given from the wronged 
party/parties."
17
 Thus if one does not explicitly ask for forgiveness, there must be some 
communicative act that the audience interprets as seeking forgiveness. 
The significance of prayer in the atonement response 
The second transitional element, prayer, is generally thought of as a private, spiritual act. 
However, in the case of public figures and organizational rhetors, looking inward can consist of 
an examination of “the existing policies and circumstances that could perpetuate similar offenses 
and examine ways to change the environment.”
18
 However, inward reflection does not serve the 
rhetor’s purpose of atonement unless there is mortification, the outward manifestation of 
reflection. A changed inward stance must be publically declared if the atonement is to be 
successful. Benoit argued that mortification includes “an apparently sincere apology, expression 
of regret, [or] request for forgiveness.”
19
 Kenneth Burke defined mortification as the “deliberate 
slaying of one’s appetites and ambitions.”
20
 In other words, mortification is intentional and 
carries with it suffering in terms of admitting one’s sinful acts or shortcomings. For example, in 
the aftermath of the Monica Lewinsky affair, Bill Clinton publically slew personal appetites and 
ambitions when he renounced “the pride and the anger which cloud judgment.” 
21
 However, as 
Koresten and Rowland have argued, if the audience does not perceive the mortification to be 
authentic “the atonement will not be perceived as genuine.”
22
 Drawing again from Kenneth 
Burke, I contend that successful mortification clearly communicates to the audience that the 
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rhetor has, in effect, put to death  those actions and attitudes that caused the sin in the first place. 
The atonement will be viewed as successfully by the audience when the offending party clearly 
demonstrates the death of prior attitudes and actions. 
The significance of charity in the atonement response 
The final step towards atonement is charity. It is through charity, the act of righting the 
wrong, that the offending party demonstrates that a change in attitude is not only realized in the 
spiritual sense but made real in the material sense. Charity can be demonstrated in a number of 
tangible ways and, in the case of organizational atonement, concrete and measured steps in how 
the offending situation will be avoided in the future are paramount. For example, Bill Clinton not 
only apologized to the Tuskegee victims and survivors but outlined the steps government would 
take to make sure such abhorrent actions would not happen again. Charity, in this case, was 
manifested not only through reparations, but also in the inception of a bioethics watchdog 
commission and the signing of an executive order directing a review of procedures when human 
subjects are used.
23
 Thus, another facet of charity is that out of tragic instances good can emerge 
and society will be the better for it. 
Taken together, the acts of atonement create a clear and demonstrated change of attitude 
to the wronged party and the audience as a whole. Seeking atonement means that seeking 
forgiveness is communicated, that mortification has been endured, and that charity is evident 
both in attitude and material reparation.  
Atonement as Toyota’s Appropriate Response to the Crisis 
In chapter one I argued for an alternative way of looking at organizational apologia by 
focusing on the constraints that shape the organization’s response. Toyota’s discourse with its 
customers was constrained and shaped by cultural forces that influence communication and 
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public relation practices in Japan. It is my contention that atonement was the best strategic 
response for addressing the cultural constraints allowing Toyota to effectively express concern, 
explicitly take the kind of action that communicated atonement to its American audience, while 
moving the company back to the Toyota Way. 
Bridging cultural differences: Atonement rhetoric as ritualized response 
 As I argued in the first chapter, there are some differences between Western and Eastern 
communication behaviors and those behaviors affect the nature of organizational apologia. 
Primary to this dichotomy is the preference of American audiences for explicit discourses in 
which the emphasis is on the person’s achievements or failures, as opposed to the Japanese 
preference for an implicit approach in which the needs of the community are paramount. In 
short, the Japanese apologist responds to the perceived need of re-establishing sincerity (mokoto) 
because it is only when the apologist is viewed as being sincere by the community that harmony 
or wa is realized. Moreover, Japanese communicative processes are ingrained as ritualized 
practices that reaffirm the importance of community and wholeness.
24
 This explains the Japanese 
proclivity for corporate apologists to exhibit silence, perform a 45-degree –bow, and then resign. 
Taken together these acts non-verbally communicate to the Japanese audience that the apologist 
is contrite, realizes that sincerity has been violated and has taken action by resigning. In other 
words, the apologist has atoned, but in a way that only “speaks” to the Japanese audience. In  
Toyota’s case the recall demanded a response that functioned to address the American 
audience’s expectations for explicit explanations and actions, while also moving the company 
back to the Toyota Way. As a strategic response, atonement rhetoric not only bridged the cultural 
differences, but provided a way for the company to move back to its own cultural roots.  
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Atonement’s effectiveness in bridging cultural constraints is due in large part to its nature 
as ritualistic response. As such, atonement serves to bring the community together by bridging 
the division between the community and the apologist.
25
 In terms of the American audience, the 
atonement ritual created identification between Toyota and its external community of customers. 
Additionally, this ritualized response was a public act and is therefore evident and explicit.  
A second facet of this explicit and public act is that atonement is a process. In the 
Western sense, the three elements of atonement function together to create what the audience 
interprets as atonement. Essentially, the audience is engaged in a process where they “analyze 
and dissect things into elements in order to understand their true nature properly.”
26
 Western 
audiences “see” three different elements and judge the overall effectiveness of the atonement by 
how well each element is addressed. Koesten and Rowland underscore this point when they 
argued that the audience must be able to interpret the apologist’s actions or words as indicative 
of repentance. Thus, if the audience is not convinced that the apologist has repented, then the 
subsequent stages of prayer and charity may not be effective either. Toyota’s challenge was to 
explicitly demonstrate that the company was moving through the atonement process in a way 
that clearly addressed the needs of its customers. The company needed to demonstrate its 
repentance in such a way that the audience would interpret the act as repentant. Moreover, the 
company had to demonstrate that the policies or circumstances that created the crisis have been 
examined and effectively put to death. Finally, Toyota needed to extend charity to its customers 
in order to demonstrate that steps had been taken to make sure a similar recall did not happen in 
the future.  In the following section, I argue that Toyota’s rhetoric of atonement in addressing the 
expectations of its customers was married with an equally repentant strategy in which the 
company atoned for its failure to live up to the mandates of the Toyota Way. 
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Atonement rhetoric as a way back to the Toyota Way 
When Akio Toyoda was officially elected as president of Toyota Motor Corporation, it 
marked the first time a Toyoda had run the company in 14 years, as well as marking a shift from 
the policies of that era. Toyoda’s rhetoric reflected his disdain for his predecessors’ focus on 
growth. For example, Japan Times reporter, Hiroko Nakata noted Toyoda’s determination to 
“review his company’s aggressive global expansion,” as well as Toyoda’s explicit criticism of 
his company’s foray into global expansion as being “growth that is larger than the size of the 
company.”
27
 Clearly, Akio Toyoda was not of the same mindset as his growth-focused 
predecessors. Moreover, Toyoda also acknowledged the failure of the company to adhere to the 
Toyota Way when he declared, during his June 2009 acceptance speech, that that it was his 
intention to steer the company out of its economic slump by “putting customers first and the 
rank-and-file first.”
28
 Akio Toyota’s pre-crisis rhetoric makes it clear that part of his tenure as 
president would be to return the company to its cultural roots where respect for people was a 
hallmark of the Toyota Way. The need for this return became critical during the recall because 
the recall was linked to a failure to adhere to the Toyota Way. For example, according to author 
Peter DeLorenzo, the Toyota Way, with its emphasis on people and learning, had been largely 
ignored during the growth period. DeLorenzo asserted that “when you start shortcutting time-
honored practices in a company that’s so big on tradition, like Toyota, things fall through the 
cracks,” resulting in a company where “becoming No. 1 was more important, per se, than the 
time-honored calling cards of safety and quality.”
29
 Ken Wheaton argued in an editorial for 
Advertising Age that Toyota had been so focused on “displacing General Motors as the world’s 
largest automaker that it lost the ‘Toyota Way’.”
30
 Moreover, Wheaton contended that not only 
did Toyota need “astute crisis communications and a lot of luck,” to deal with the recall, but the 
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company would also need “to get back to that Toyota way.”
31
 Given the need for Toyota to atone 
for its faulty initial handling of the crisis, it is also clear that atonement needed to also address 
the company’s failure to adhere to its own philosophical roots. Again, the ritualized process of 
atonement coupled with its triune elements of repentance, prayer, and charity functioned to 
effectively move Toyota back to the Way. 
Shlomo Deshon maintained that the effect of the atonement ritual within a community is 
that people return to their everyday lives “after having been exposed to the essence of their 
culture, and after having attained profound instruction about themselves in the context of that 
culture.”
32
  This theme of recognition and instruction was particularly important as Toyota 
embraced the atonement ritual. Atonement allowed the company to step outside of the day-to-
day workings of the company to reflect publically, as a community, on the importance of the 
Toyota Way and to commit themselves to following the Toyota Way. Moreover, atonement 
provided the way to honor the Shinto virtues on which the Toyoda Way was based. Essentially, 
the kami-no-michi of Shinto and the Toyota Way are parallel paths that address personal ethics 
and organizational ethics.
33
  Organizationally, atonement provided the way for Toyota to re-
establish social harmony within its community by repenting for the company’s failure to follow 
the Toyota Way. This was accomplished through organizational narratives in which Toyota 
employees, including Akio Toyoda, rededicated themselves to the Toyota Way. This 
rededication was manifested through the multiple acts of charity through the massive recalls, 
new consumer-focused safety programs, and the reparations paid for its delinquent initial 
handling of the recall. At the same time these acts of public, communal repentance bridged the 
divide between Toyota Motor Corporation as apologist and the American car public as 
community.  
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 In the preceding pages I have developed a plausible claim for a rhetoric of atonement as 
the way in which Toyota addressed the recall crisis and returned to its ancestral roots of the 
Toyota Way. In the following chapter  I develop this claim by looking at Toyota’s public 
relations campaign of early 2010. This campaign, consisting of letters, and short personal 
narratives of Toyota employees and customers, sought to rebuild the ruptured relationship 
between Toyota and its customers through a ritualized process of public, communal repentance.  
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Chapter 4: 
Regaining the Road: Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement 
 
A Fatal Accident and Near-Fatal Early Responses 
 
 
Toyota’s road to redemption via atonement was carried out in an approximately four -
and- a- half-week campaign between late January and early March of 2010. Through a series of 
written and visual messages, Toyota explicitly repented for its lack of customer-focused 
communication in the early days of the recall crisis, reflected on policies and actions that had 
precipitated the recall, and then set out a plan of action to address the recall with a concurrent 
shift in policies and actions taken regarding those policies. In the case of the policies and actions 
that had played a part in a lack of customer-focused communication, Toyota also successfully 
demonstrated a shift in the company’s culture from one centered on growth and expansion back 
to the foundational philosophy of the Toyota Way. In the following chapter I trace the trajectory 
of Toyota’s atonement beginning with the crash that killed a California Highway Patrolman and 
his family in August of 2009, Toyota’s failed attempts to explicitly atone for the crash, and the 
subsequent four months that marked the start of the recalls. Those failed attempts are followed 
by a “brief pause,” that, I argue, constituted a liminal moment designed to separate Toyota’s 
previous bungled communication efforts from the subsequent atonement rhetoric. On down the 
road to redemption, I illuminate atonement at work through the written and visual atonement 
messages and conclude with evidence of the success of the campaign through audience reaction. 
August 2009 – January 21, 2010: Accelerating Towards Disaster 
On August 28, 2009 off-duty California Highway Patrolman Mark Saylor, and three of 
his family members, were killed when, according to Chris Woodyard of USA Today, the loaner 
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Lexus ES Saylor was driving began “racing out of control at more than 100 mph and Saylor 
could not stop it.”
1
 Rachel Raskin-Zrihen of the Vallejo Times Herald reported that a 911 cell 
phone call from a passenger indicated that the accelerator was stuck and Saylor could not free it; 
the car eventually “clipped a Ford Explorer, smashed through a fence, hit an embankment and 
burst into flames.”
2
  
This single accident focused attention on the relationship between floor mats and jammed 
accelerators in Toyota vehicles. Clarence M. Ditlow, executive director of the Center for Auto 
Safety, pronounced the California accident “a watershed event,” contending that Saylor was “an 
experienced highway patrol officer,” and “if he couldn’t bring the car under control, who 
could?”
3
 Ditlow also noted the well publicized 911 call detailing the family’s final moments. 
Clearly, the California accident should have prompted an immediate response from Toyota. 
Unfortunately it did not. 
Toyota’s effort to address the growing recall crisis between September of 2009 and 
January of 2010 was characterized by a marked inconsistency between words and actions. While 
there were instances where atonement seemed imminent, that rhetoric was either never fully 
developed or was buried in messages designed to address the fiscal issues Toyota was facing. 
Toyota’s first action following the San Diego crash was to order dealers to inspect the floor mats 
in both Toyota and Lexus vehicles.
4
 Then, according to Nick Bunkley of the New York Times, 
Toyota announced that it would recall some 3.8 million cars to deal with the floor mat issue. No 
timeline for the recall was announced. At the time of Bunkley’s article, both Toyota and NHTSA 
were “urging owners to simply remove the driver’s side mat while Toyota works out a 
solution.”
5
  So while there was some movement towards rectifying what may have been a cause 
of the San Diego crash, there was no immediate response by Toyota expressing care and concern 
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for the Saylor family specifically or an announced plan of action to reassure Toyota customers in 
general. 
 However, in October of 2009, Toyota President Akio Toyoda did attempt to atone for the 
loss of life. The setting for what Hiroko Tabuchi characterized as a “litany of apologies to 
astonished reporters,” was a press conference at the Japan National Press Club.
 6
  The 
beleaguered Toyoda was responding to news of the company’s continuing annual losses, but he 
also addressed the fatal San Diego crash. According to Tabuchi, Toyoda “wailed” that “four 
precious lives have been lost. I offer my deepest condolences. Customers bought our cars 
because they thought they were the safest. But now we have given them cause for grave concern. 
I can’t begin to express my remorse.”
7
 While offering condolences and linking Toyota vehicles 
to safety concerns, Akio Toyoda’s effort to atone during his emotional news conference failed in 
a number of ways. First, he failed to move beyond a tepid acknowledgement of wrongdoing to 
communicating in a way that would signal his audience he was asking forgiveness on behalf of 
the company. Second, in speaking to an audience of Japanese reporters, Toyoda failed to directly 
address the American audience. Third, Toyoda buried his expression of remorse in a laundry list 
of other concerns including the company’s decision to close a production plant in California, the 
failure of the company to design cars that would entice younger drivers, and a declared desire to 
return the company to profit, “so we can start paying taxes and go back to contributing to 
society.”
8
 At no point did Toyoda speak to the floor mat recall, what the company was doing to 
address the issue, or when that recall, promised a month earlier, would commence. There was no 
movement rhetorically towards reflection -- the company had been engaged in addressing what 
had to change in terms of the link between safe cars and customers’ concerns – or towards 
charity – what action the company would take.  Indeed, some experts dismissed Toyoda’s tearful 
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apology. Robert Dujarric, director Temple University’s Japanese-based Institute of 
Contemporary Japanese Culture contended that “sometimes, this apology business is a way to 
avoid taking real action or responsibility.”
9
 It was only in November of 2009, two-and-a-half 
months after the San Diego crash and one month following Akio Toyoda’s “litany of apologies,” 
that the Toyota sent out letters to customers outlining the nature of the floor mat issue, declaring 
that the company would “remedy your vehicle at no charge,” while again urging drivers to 
remove driver side floor mats.
10
 Simply put, Toyota failed to create a consistent narrative that 
indicated repentance, reflection with mortification, and charity.  
Toyota continued to fumble towards atonement throughout the early winter of 2009 and 
into 2010. When the second recall for sticking accelerators was issued on January 21, 2010, the 
announcement appeared on the company’s website. The lack of explicit, public communication 
only served to compound growing perceptions that Toyota did not care about its customers. 
Matthew Benson, head of a San Francisco corporate communications firm, underscored this 
point when he observed that “companies often start out looking at issues as narrow operational or 
financial problems,” and that “if they don’t deal with the communications piece,” than such 
problems can morph into “very, very, big reputation problem[s].”
11
 Clearly, Toyota was not 
meeting standards of communication that would clearly signal a shift to a new attitude towards 
the needs of customers accompanied by a shift in action to explicitly demonstrate that attitude 
change. However, Toyota’s communication would drastically shift in late January as the 
company finally “got it” and atoned for its previous failure to communicate care and concern for 
Toyota drivers by explicitly and quickly dealing with the recall by making statements and taking 
other steps to demonstrate repentance. 
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January 26 – January 31: A temporary pause to communicate a shift in attitude & action 
The shift towards atonement occurred Tuesday, January 26, when Toyota shut down 
production at five of its North American plants, and suspended sales of eight Toyota models. In 
his February letter in the Washington Post, Akio Toyoda explained his decision to shut down 
production as having “pulled the andon cord for our company.”
12
 The andon cord is a device on 
the Toyota production line that allows team members to shut down the line “if there’s a 
production problem.”
13
  This act was immediately noticed and commented upon by the media. 
For example, the production halt was characterized as “unusual,” by Nick Bunkley of the  New 
York Times, and viewed as a “self-imposed ban,” by Roger Vincent and Ken Bensinger  in a Los 
Angeles Times article.
14
 Thomas Sloma-Williams, writing in the March 2010 issue of Quality, 
argued that the halt in production was part of Toyota’s larger recall efforts that demonstrated “a 
degree of courage its peers do not possess.”
15
 The effect of taking the action to shut down the 
line successfully communicated that the car company, as a whole, had recognized that there was 
a problem that needed attention. However, because American audiences place a premium on 
actions coupled with words, Toyota needed to quickly follow- up pulling the “andon cord” with 
an appropriately customer centered discourse.  
Toyota did just that when the halt in production was followed on Sunday, January 31, 
with a full-page announcement that was carried in 20 newspapers across the United States. The 
announcement headline simply read: “A temporary pause. To put you first.”
16
 Below the 
headline was a pause button, and at the bottom of the page was an explanation as to “Why we’ve 
temporarily stopped some of our plants.”
17
 The announcement acknowledged that in “rare cases 
sticking accelerator pedals have occurred in some of our vehicles,” and the halt in production had 
been called in order to “focus on the vehicles we’ve recalled.”
18
 Toyota characterized the 
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production halt as an “unprecedented,” action but one that was “the right thing to do for our 
customers.”
19
 Noreen O’Leary of Adweek, while criticizing Toyota’s sole use of its website for 
the January 21 pedal recall, viewed the temporary pause announcement in a more favorable light. 
O’Leary characterized the announcement as one in which Toyota “spoke more directly to the 
consumers.”
20
 Clearly, the act of bringing the production line to a halt and announcing that 
shutdown in an explicit, timely manner was viewed as a positive move for Toyota customers. 
The production halt and subsequent announcement together created a liminal moment 
signaling a shift to Toyota’s subsequent atonement. Larry Smith of the Institute for Crisis 
Management argued that the pause ad was “intended to buy Toyota a bit of time, to ask people to 
give them a chance.” 
21
 However, the pause message also indicated a shift of attention and action 
within Toyota. Kenneth Burke explained the general principle when, in citing George Herbert 
Mead’s Mind, Self, and Society, argued that the power of language lies in its ability to create both 
overt and incipient action.
22
 Burke maintained that attitude functions not only as “substitute for 
an act, it can likewise be the first step towards an act.”
23
 In the case of the temporary pause 
announcement, Toyota was taking the first step towards atonement. In recognizing and 
anticipating the attitudes of others, the Toyota customer, the company demonstrated an 
attitudinal shift that would move it towards modifying its actions so that the customer would be 
put first.  
Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement 
The “Temporary Pause,” message allowed Toyota to move beyond its previous failed 
communication in order to fully engage in rhetoric where atonement was evident through 
messages that were repentant, humbling and action – oriented.  At no time did Toyota explicitly 
atone for poorly installed floor mats and potentially defective accelerator pedals. Toyota did 
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explicitly atone for failing customers by failing to adhere to the Toyota Way.  By using the 
company’s historical commitment to building quality, reliable, and safe vehicles, Toyota 
characterized its failure not in terms of specific car-related anomalies, but rather as a breach of 
trust between the company and its customers. Thus, throughout Toyota’s messages during this 
period, repentance and reflection with mortification were framed within a larger narrative of the 
company’s history of customer commitment based on the Toyota Way. This narrative and the 
attendant atonement were carried out in a series of consistent, coordinated, written and visual 
messages, with a defined trajectory that clearly indicated a change in Toyota’s approach to 
handling customer concerns and business practices.  
February 2010: Written expressions of atonement  
 Toyota’s written messages consisted of announcements framed as personal letters, 
promises and pledges, and two editorials written by Toyota President Akio Toyoda. Through the 
use of the print announcements, Toyota demonstrated its ability and willingness to adapt to the 
needs of its American audience in terms of explicit communication. Toyota’s written messages 
conveyed clear, direct apologies. Moreover, those messages not only outlined  the actions Toyota 
was taking within the context of the immediate crisis, but also explained what  actions the 
company would be taking moving into the future. Additionally, Toyota’s atonement was 
grounded in the company’s promise to return to the Toyota Way. The company’s philosophy, 
with its twin pillars of respect for customers and continuous learning, functioned as reflection, 
the second hallmark of atonement. Not only were the company’s failures contrasted with its 
historical values, but subsequent charitable actions were promoted as the only way in which earn 
back the trust of customers as well as restoring harmony within Toyota. 
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The first message following the “Temporary Pause,” announcement appeared in 
newspapers nationwide on February 2, 2010.  “An Open Letter to Toyota Customers,” is a short 
one - page letter that appears as if it had just been removed from an envelope; the folding creases 
are evident. The letter, addressed to “Dear Toyota Customers,” and signed by Jim Lentz, 
President and CEO of Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., is a stark contrast to Toyota’s previous 
impersonal web posting of the pedal recall. The use of a personal letter format constitutes an 
acknowledgement that Toyota committed acts requiring a personal yet public declaration of  how 
those acts affected customers, and what steps the company would take to rectify those missteps. 
In short, the open letter functions as atonement for the company’s failure to hold to the Toyota 
Way standard of respecting people. 
 In terms of written content, the letter leads with a reflection of Toyota’s heritage: “For 
more than 50 years, Toyota has provided you with “safe, reliable, quality vehicles and first rate 
service.” 
24
  The letter clearly implies that this is what Toyota should be, but has not been, for its 
customers. Lenz then offers a simple and direct apology to customers: “I am truly sorry for the 
concern our recalls have caused.”
25
 By juxtaposing a reflection on Toyota’s history with the 
present day recall, Lentz is able to create the perception that Toyota is asking for forgiveness for 
not attending to customers’ concerns. Lentz links the company apology to action designed to 
address those concerns as he assures readers “we’re doing everything we can – as fast as we can 
– to make things right.”
26
 This upfront apology, coupled with a statement of action, stands in 
stark contrast to Akio Toyoda’s failed atonement attempt during the October press conference at 
the Japan National Press Club. Moreover, the letter moves beyond a statement of a quick 
response to specific and tangible acts that constitute charity. These acts include “a 
comprehensive plan to permanently fix the vehicles we’ve recalled.”
27
  In a subsequent four-
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point list, Lentz clearly indicates not only the technical aspects of the  plan in terms of  the 
production of “precision parts” to reinforce the accelerator pedals, the shipping of those parts, 
and the training of technicians to perform the repairs, but he addresses Toyota’s respect for 
customers by declaring “We’re writing to all customers affected by the Pedal recall, as well as 
the Floor Mat recall, to let them know how to schedule a convenient appointment with their local 
dealer.”
28
 The use of a list is effective because it draws the audience’s attention to each separate 
action. Moreover, because the list was put in writing and published nationally, it functioned as a 
type of contract between Toyota and its customers.  
Mortification is also evident in the four-point list. Within an organizational context, 
mortification requires specific acts that respond to the sinful acts. While mortification can be 
expressed in words, it can also be expressed physically. Burke supports this contention when he 
argues that mortification carries with it not only an inward change, but an outward manifestation 
through “penance, abstinence or painful severities inflicted on the body.”
29
  Inherent in Burke’s 
conception of mortification is that it is entered into willingly. In Toyota’s case, penance involved 
shutting down factories and  halting sales thus forcing dealers to work “extended hours – some of 
them 24/7” and increasing costs to the company in terms of “adding staff to get through the 
repairs as quickly as possible.”
30
 Clearly, sacrifices were being made by the company in order to 
demonstrate its commitment to putting customers first. The most important of these actions was 
the shutdown of the production line in order “to focus fully on fixing this problem in the vehicles 
that are on the road.” Lentz admits that “Stopping production is never an easy decision – but 
we’re confident it’s the right thing to do for our customers.” In sum, the open letter apologized 
for actions while demonstrating Toyota’s change of attitude through acts of willing mortification 
where the recall was concerned. 
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The “Open Letter” was quickly followed by “There’s Been A Lot of Talk About The 
Recall,” message on February 5th.
31
 In this message, again signed by Jim Lentz, Toyota spells 
out what to do if “your accelerator becomes harder to press,” with an assurance that “at Toyota 
we take this issue very seriously.”
32
 Just how seriously the company is taking the issue is 
reflected in the subsequent content. The “Open Letter” was a mea culpa with a plan of action. 
What Toyota accomplishes with this second message is to frame current actions as the result of 
past actions. The first message stated that  Toyota was in the process of writing to customers; in 
the second message Lentz informs the reader that “We’re starting to send letters this weekend to 
owners involved in the recall to schedule an appointment at their dealer.”
33
  In the “Open Letter,” 
there was an anticipation of customers scheduling appointments through  Lentz’ assurance that 
“many of or dealers will be working extended hours – some of them 2/7 – and adding staff to get 
through the repairs as quickly as possible.”
34
 In the “Talk” message, that anticipation of what 
customers will require, in terms of a speedy repair trip, is manifested through actions that result 
in “dealerships hav[ing] extended their hours.”
35
 In the “Open Letter,” customers were told that 
dealerships were being trained as to how to repair the pedals. In the subsequent message, 
customers are told that “trained technicians have begun making repairs.”
36
 Thus, training has 
resulted in the repair process moving forward. Finally, there is a shift from a customer- centered 
attitude to customer-centered action. In the “Open Letter,” Lentz assured his audience that 
Toyota’s “entire organization of 172,000 North American employees and dealership personnel is 
committed to you,” while in the “There’s Been A Lot of Talk” message those 172,000 Toyota 
employees have been “mobilized.”
37
 In running the two messages closely together, Toyota was 
able to create the impression of an efficient, speedy, response to the recall. Moreover, Jim Lentz 
explicitly promised to “update you with accurate and timely information about the status of the 
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recall in the days and weeks ahead.”
38
 This level of open and timely communication stands in 
stark contrast to the company’s previous lack of communication.  
Perhaps no one within Toyota expressed atonement more than Toyota President Akio 
Toyoda. Dubbed “No-Show Akio,” because of his failure to address the crisis affecting his 
company in the early days of the recall, Toyoda distinguished himself in the atonement campaign 
with two editorials published in the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal. In these two 
articles, repentance and reflection are expressly tied to the Toyota Way.  
In the Post article, Toyoda states that Toyota’s entry into the auto business had been 
“based on a simple, but powerful principle: that Toyota would build the highest-quality, safest, 
and most reliable automobiles in the world.”
39
 Toyota customers, Toyoda argues, “are not simply 
purchasing a car, truck or van. They are placing their trust in our company.”
40
 Toyota customers 
trusted the company to produce quality, safe, reliable automobiles. President Toyoda 
acknowledges the violation of that trust when he writes that “the past weeks, however, have 
made clear that Toyota has not lived up to the high standards we set for ourselves. More 
important, we have not lived up to the high standards you have come to expect from us.”
41
 
Having recognized the sin, Toyoda offers a clear and explicit apology: “I am deeply disappointed 
by that [the failure to live up the standards] and apologize. As the president of Toyota, I take 
personal responsibility.”
42
  The cultural significance of a Japanese corporate leader explicitly 
accepting personal responsibility for a violation of customer trust is profound. In a country when 
the 45-degree silent bow of humiliation is the cultural norm, Akio Toyoda clearly demonstrated 
an awareness of the needs of his American audience for a direct acceptance of responsibility. 
Moreover, unlike the previous communiques from Jim Lentz, Toyoda explicitly acknowledges 
that the company made mistakes. In an act of contrition, Toyoda admits “we are taking 
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responsibility for our mistakes, learning from them and acting immediately to address the 
concerns of consumers and independent government regulators.”
43
 
But Toyoda does not stop at promising that action would be taken. In five lengthy 
paragraphs, Toyoda spells out the specifics of that action. First, Toyoda writes that “I have 
launched a top-to-bottom review of our global operations,” and as part of that effort he vows to 
“establish an Automotive Center of Quality Excellence in the United States, where a team of our 
top engineers will focus on strengthening our quality management and quality control across 
North America.”
44
 Next, Toyoda promises not only to appoint a “blue-ribbon safety advisory 
group” of “outside experts,” to review the company’s operations, but also promises that the 
findings “will be made available to the public, as will Toyota’s responses to these findings.”
45
  
Third, Toyoda vows to aggressively address customer complaints, and fourth to address 
communication problems within the company by “putting in place steps to do a better job within 
Toyota of sharing important quality and safety information across our global operations.”
46
 
Finally, in a related communication issue, Toyoda vows to “increase its outreach to government 
agencies charged with protecting the safety of motorists and passengers.”
47
 Toyoda then ends his 
letter by paying homage to the Toyota Way and its call for an “unwavering commitment to 
continuous learning: going to the source of the problem and fixing it.”
48
 Within the context of the 
Toyota Way, President Toyoda asserts that “great companies learn from their mistake, and we 
know we have to win back to the trust of our customers by adhering to the very values on which 
that trust is built.”
49
 Thus, in this letter, Akio Toyoda not only makes clear his and the company’s  
repentance by admitting that the company had made mistakes, but he publically reflects on those 
mistakes as part of a larger learning experience. Finally, Toyoda offers a plan of action that 
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extends beyond the immediate recall to the company’s actions as a whole by putting in place a 
series of controls and outside reviews designed to get the company back on the Toyota Way. 
Toyoda does not repeat his statements of repentance in his February 23, 2010, Wall Street 
Journal letter. The focus of this letter is reflection with an emphasis on mortification. Toyoda’s 
challenge in this letter is to demonstrate that he and his company have made a clean and explicit 
break from past policies and actions that created the crisis. Akio Toyoda successfully 
accomplishes this task by separating the ‘old’ Toyota, with its focus on growth and profits, from 
the ‘new’ Toyota with an emphasis on customer care and quality vehicles. For example, Toyoda 
declares that “since last June, when I took over as president of the company, I have personally 
placed the highest priority on improving quality, not quantity.” 
50
 Toyoda sets himself apart from 
the previous three presidents under whose leadership the company had strayed from the Toyota 
Way.  Moreover, the way forward for the company is to return to the foundational roots of the 
company. Toyoda argues that” When my grandfather brought Toyota into the auto business in 
1937 he created a set of principles that has always guided how we operate. We call it the Toyota 
Way, and its pillars are ‘respect for people,’ and ‘continuous learning.’ I believe in these core 
principles. And I am convinced that the only way for Toyota to emerge stronger from this 
experience is to adhere more closely to them.”
51
 In setting himself apart from previous non-
family member presidents, and by reaffirming his belief in the core principles of the Toyota 
Way, Akio Toyoda demonstrates a change of attitude, and a shift in policy so that the acts that 
had precipitated the crisis will not occur again. Moreover, Toyoda links the return to the Toyota 
Way to support of Toyota customers who, in “bringing their vehicles to our dealers for repair 
continue to tell us how much they love our cars, and I deeply appreciate their loyalty.”
52
 If any 
reader is in doubt of what a return to the Toyota Way entails, Akio Toyoda bluntly asserts that 
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“we must do better – much better – in responding to safety issues. That is why I am taking the 
company back to basics. Across Toyota, we are our customers and the values on which our 
company was founded, front and center.”
53
 Thus, a return to the Toyota Way, with its people - 
focused principles, is the way back to safety; a way back to order as opposed to the disorder of 
the recall.  
Having separated the quantity-focused past from the customer-focused future, Toyoda 
spends the rest of the letter describing current and future customer-focused actions. Whereas the 
previous atonement messages painted the charitable acts in broad strokes, here Toyoda focuses 
on the details of the charitable actions that his company will take.  For example, the previous 
pledges for outside safety reviews now take on a name: “Exponent, a world-class engineering 
and scientific consulting firm,” has been tasked with conducting a “comprehensive, independent 
analysis of our electronic throttle control systems that we will make public when completed.”
54
 
Additionally, Toyoda contextualizes the recent recall of Prius and Lexus models for anti-lock 
brake issues as “listening more closely to customer concerns,” and announces that “as an added 
customer confidence measure,” Toyota will be one of the “first full-line vehicle manufacturers to 
make advanced brake-override systems standard on all of our existing models,” as well as on an 
“expanded range of existing models.”
55
 Finally, Toyoda ends with a pledge for transparency, and 
a promise that he will “continue to personally visit our sales and manufacturing workplaces to 
reaffirm the Toyota commitment to excellent quality.”
56
 In providing the details about who will 
be conducting the outside safety review, announcing plans for installing brake-override systems, 
and taking partial responsibility for assuring that quality concerns are met, Akio Toyoda 
solidifies the new attitude of the company as opposed to previous attitudes. He is, in effect, 
providing grounds on which his promises of reparations can be judged. 
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February 2010: Visual expressions of atonement  
 While Toyota used the written medium to communicate atonement in clear and explicit 
terms, the company also ran a series of videos on television and You Tube through which Toyota 
created a narrative that told the story of the company in the United States, its historical 
dedication to building quality vehicles for U.S. customers, and put a face on the company’s U.S. 
workforce. Two videos stand out in this regard. The first, “Commitment” aired on February 7, 
2010, during the Super Bowl. 
57
  The second, entitled “Toyota Restore,” aired on February 11, 
2010.  In both videos Toyota’s history is the visual element while the explicit atonement message 
is carried by the voice-over.  
For example, the one-minute “Commitment” video begins with a black-and-white shot of 
1960s Toyota dealerships, and then focuses on a young couple shaking hands with a Toyota 
dealer. These shots transition into color footage of a woman and children climbing into a Toyota. 
These customer shots are followed by a rapid chronological montage of eight Toyota models. 
This montage then segues into footage of modern American Toyota plants in which we see 
Toyota employees engaged in a variety of activities, including vehicle inspections and 
production line discussions. Other Toyota employees are showed gathered in front of a white 
board engaged in discussion. These clips of active, engaged employees and cars moving along 
the line are followed by a shot of a plant during the production stoppage. The video ends with a 
repeat shot of the same couple featured at the beginning of the spot. 
Through the use of black and white film giving way to color, along with the rapid 
sequence of Toyotas past and present, the history of Toyota unfolds for the viewer. An argument 
could be made that the ad relies on a strategic use of bolstering, but the somber voice-over leaves 
no doubt that the purpose of the ad is to humble Toyota in the face of its history, and atone to the 
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viewing audience. The footage up and through the car montage sets the historical context: “For 
over fifty years providing you with safe, reliable, high quality vehicles has been our first 
priority.”
58
 The second part of the video, including the shot of the shut-down Toyota plant, 
carries the message of repentance that includes admitting publically that standards have slipped 
to the detriment of the customer: “In recent days our company hasn’t been living up to the 
standards you’ve come to expect from us or we expect from ourselves.”
59
 This admission clearly 
indicates mortification in that Toyota knows its standards slipped, forcing the shutdown, which is 
“why 172,000 Toyota dealerships and employees are dedicated to making things right.”
60
 The ad 
then moves to what the company is doing to rectify the situation and why: Technicians are 
making repairs….we are working around the clock to assure we build vehicles of the highest 
quality to restore your faith in our company.”
61
  As this last statement is made the film shifts 
back to the same couple featured at the beginning of the video. Clearly, the intent is to return the 
company to its roots of putting customers first by focusing again on building the kind of vehicles 
on which customer trust had been built previously. Moreover, key words in the video link to the 
previously published “Open Letter,” and “There’s Been A Lot of Talk,” announcements. Both 
reference Toyota’s fifty year history, the production halt, the dedication of 172,000 United States 
Toyota employees, and the attention to safety.  
Four days later, two days after Akio Toyota’s Washington Post letter, the “Toyota 
Restore,” video aired. Like the “Commitment” video, this film is a retrospective. The opening 
shots narrow from a city-scape to an old stone building and finally a car production line. The 
middle portion of the video, shot in color, focuses on three different employee scenarios: 
American and Japanese engineers gathered around a white board, a mechanic working on an 
accelerator pedal, and Toyota line workers. The final shot segues back to black and white 
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footage of a child climbing into a Toyota. The accompanying voice-over contextualizes the film 
in a 67-word voice-over: “History has shown that a good company will fix it mistakes but a great 
company will learn from them. That’s why Toyota engineers have rigorously tested the solution 
for our recalls and our dealers are repairing up to 50,000 vehicles a day with confidence. We’re 
working to restore your faith in our company by providing you with safe, reliable vehicles like 
we have for over fifty years.”
62
 In 67-words, Toyota acknowledges it has made mistakes, has 
learned from those mistakes, is taking actions to rectify the mistakes, and by doing so will return 
to what Toyota customers came to trust in the first place – building safe and reliable cars. 
The difference then between the “Commitment” and “Restore” videos is that the first 
highlights Toyota’s commitment to customers, while the second contextualizes atonement in 
terms of the second pillar of the Toyota Way, “continuous learning.” Learning is evident in the 
shot of engineers engaged in the white board discussion, and the technician working on the 
accelerator.  Learning is presented through the verbal acknowledgment that the company has 
“rigorously tested the solution for our recall,” and that, while “a good company will fix its 
mistakes,” Toyota is a great company because it “will learn from them [the mistakes].” These 
statements parallel Akio Toyota’s admission that “we are taking responsibility for our mistakes, 
learning from them, and acting immediately,” as well as his assurance that “great companies 
learn from their mistakes.”
63
 By using a retrospective narrative in which admissions of 
“mistakes,” are coupled with visual examples of learning, Toyota demonstrates that the company 
has reflected on, and learned from, its mistakes.  
Beyond telling the story of a company learning from its mistakes in order to restore faith 
in its products, the Toyota video campaign provided a visual forum for customers to voice 
recognition of Toyota’s mortification with subsequent messages of forgiveness. The video was 
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uploaded by Toyota to You Tube on February 26, 2010 towards the end of the atonement 
campaign. In positioning the video at this point of the atonement rhetoric, Toyota was able to 
show an explicit affirmation of customers’ willingness to acknowledge the company’s actions, 
and words as doing right by the customer, and thus, indicative of repentance. 
In the video filmed at a Southern California Toyota dealership, three Toyota customers, 
all with vehicles in for recall related repairs, express their concern about the recall, their personal 
experiences with the repair process, and their faith in Toyota to do right by their customers. For 
example, Nevin G., the owner of a 2010 Toyota Corolla, admits that “Basically my car is new so 
I was a little bit worried. I had to call the service and they scheduled me for today. I wasn’t 
worried because I know…I know if there is something wrong they will take care of it”
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Kathleen, a new Toyota customer, had called the dealership and “got reassurances that it was 
going to be O.K.” Moreover, this new member to the Toyota customer family asserts “at least 
my experience tells me that they will take good care of the recall and they’ll take care of it 
promptly, and efficiently, and with excellent service.”
65
 Perhaps the most explicit expression of 
forgiveness came from Zac H. who had brought his 2010 Prius in for repairs. Having made an 
appointment for what he termed “in-and-out-repairs,” Zac defends Toyota, arguing “they had a 
problem…they had some problems and they’re fixing it, so I think they’re living up to their 
standards. I don’t think it’s as bad as people say, but I’m a happy customer with Toyota and 
always will be. Toyotas been (sic) a great car for me.”
66
 Clearly, these Toyota customers 
recognize Toyota’s effort at repentance. 
Moreover, efforts of the dealership to put the customer first were recognized and 
applauded by these customers. All commented on the ease of scheduling and bringing their 
vehicles in for repairs. Kathleen, for example, was told to “bring it in any time and if you need a 
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rental car you can have it,” while Nevin notes “people here, they’re very friendly and I find out 
that everything goes fast.”
67
 Zac characterizes his repair visit as one in which he “dropped my 
car off, came back, and picked it up.”
68
 Comments such as these support Toyota’s assertions 
made throughout their communiques that dealers were doing their upmost to honor the busy 
schedules of their customers. Additionally, the featured dealership was also taking the extra step 
of washing their customers’ Toyotas following the repairs. This added measure of charity was 
also noted by the interviewees. Kathleen, for example laughed that “they do seven minutes of 
work and I get a free car wash.”
69
  Thus, in a short one minute-thirty-three second video, Toyota 
is forgiven and its acts of charity, including the repairs, the scheduling, and completion of the 
repairs, as well as the extra attention to customer service through a free car wash, were given 
prominence. More importantly, as the customers’ discussed their Toyota experience, running 
silently were shots of car pedals being removed and repaired, cars pulling in and out of the shop 
area, and cars receiving the complimentary wash following repairs. In this video, words and 
actions combine to deliver a clear message that Toyota is worthy of redemption and, at least with 
these customers, has been forgiven.  
In March, Toyota uploaded two other videos focusing on Toyota’s American workforce. 
One of the videos was a twin of the customer video in that it was shot at the same California 
dealership and tells the customer service and repair story from the dealership’s perspective. The 
second Toyota workforce video showcased team members at the Georgetown Kentucky 
production plant. These apparently spontaneous, on-the-job conversations with Toyota 
employees provided a way for American Toyota workers to talk about the recall, their 
commitment to continuous learning, and their focus on customers. By taking the audience into a 
Toyota dealership and the production plant, Toyota demonstrated not only its transparency in 
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terms of processes and operations, but also provided justification for its customers’ loyalty and 
good will.  
For example, while the customer video focuses on the attitudes of the customers, the 
dealership video focuses on actions taken by the dealership to resolve the recall issues. John 
Flores, the featured technician, takes the audience on a “behind the scenes” tour of the repair 
process beginning at the point where, “a customer comes in, they drop their car off, and we take 
care of the all the fixes that apply to their vehicle.”
70
 In what follows, Flores takes the audience 
through the repair process including the removal of an accelerator pedal, the use of “special 
gauges in order to figure out what clearance we have here,” and, once that determination is 
made, “we get the appropriate support bar and install it,” which is followed by installing “a shim 
through the bottom here, actually come in from the back side, make sure its seated correctly, pop 
it a couple of times and reinstall the cover.”
71
 The accent here is on the tangible act of doing 
what Toyota said it would do, and was doing. Moreover, when the focus shifts to Manager Billy 
Rinker, those tangible acts are tied explicitly to customers’ attitudes towards Toyota. Rinker 
asserts that “people have been coming in and they’ve been really pleased that Toyota stepped up 
as quickly and efficiently as they did.” 
72
 Moreover, both Rinker and Flores focus on the effects 
of Toyota’s actions on customer satisfaction in terms of standards, safety, and the history of the 
company. For example, Flores talks of his own high standards and those of Toyota and “I believe 
that’s why we have such loyal customers that keep on coming to us year after year.” Rinker 
argues “You know this is part of what we’re doing to satisfy our customer, so I hope that Toyota 
can get the work out there that they do put their customer first, that they put safety first. If you’ve 
owned a Toyota you have that history and you know that it is something that is going to be a 
reliable car.”
73
 In sum, this video serves as a justification for the earlier customer video. In 
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showing the audience the actual process of repairing the accelerator pedal, Flores’ actions 
support the assertions of the customers that Toyota is providing prompt, effective, and excellent 
service in terms of the recall.  
A similar focus on justifying customers’ faith is exemplified in the last atonement themed 
video of this study. The focus of the video is a series of conversations with various plant team 
members. What makes this video unique is that it not only focuses on actions taken during the 
shutdown, and subsequent recall, but there is movement late in the video signaling Toyota’s 
transition out of the recall crisis and  back to image maintenance strategies. 
The “Team Members’ Perspectives,” video opens with a shot of the Georgetown 
Kentucky Toyota production plant. As opposed to the earlier “Commitment,” and “Restore,” 
spots in which the organizational history of Toyota sets the stage for the subsequent atonement, 
the plant video is a retrospective of what team members were doing during the shutdown in 
terms of continuous learning and, by extension, customer care. One of the main points repeatedly 
articulated by the team members is that the shutdown was not a vacation. For example, 
Assembly and Safety team member Tony Hendrichs asserts “We had plenty to do….plenty to do. 
We’d prefer not, ya know, to shut down the works but we definitely utilized that time.”
74
 Brian 
Howard, a paint detail team member, makes it clear that, “Toyota is paying us to come in during 
these non-production days. They want to be sure and provide us with work.” Moreover, he 
assures the audience that “rather than sitting around playing cards, we’re looking at ways, ya 
know, to make things better for us and make things better for our customers.”
75
 The implication 
is that Toyota used the shutdown as a period of reflection and refinement of its production 
processes. 
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In terms of the plant, the reflection process was one of learning. Chris Wright, a member 
of the paint detail team explains “While the line was down, [we] worked on training, helping 
members to better themselves.”
76
 Lisa Webb, a team member in the plastics production area 
expands on Wright’s explanation: “We really got into, ya know, more detailed things training all 
of our team members to bring them up to even a higher level of understanding about things.”
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Thus the focus of the shutdown training was to take an already well-trained production team to a 
higher level of training.  
But more than just training, the shutdown focused team members’ attention on the 
problems associated with the shutdown and subsequent recall. Chris Wright was adamant on this 
point: “One thing we do here is problem solve. We’re going to figure out what’s wrong, we’re 
gonna fix it, we’re gonna move on and we’ll be a better company because of it.”
78
 Problem 
solving is linked to discovering “what’s wrong,” which leads to fixing the problem. More 
importantly, while problems are acknowledged as happening and needing fixing, such problems 
will not prevent Toyota or its team members from moving forward. In fact, finding and fixing 
problems will only benefit the company. In a Shinto sense, such a production philosophy speaks 
to the notion of good flowing out of bad. In a production sense this means that team members 
have to pay attention to, and take actions towards, resolving problems. Brian Howard 
underscores this point when he talks about the effect of the recall on problem solving. “Yeah, it’s 
definitely motivated people to take a second look and make sure they are doing everything as 
well as they can be.”
79
 Here, the shutdown and subsequent recall is recast from a problem to a 
learning experience from which the company can only benefit. Moreover, problem solving is tied 
to producing quality cars, and this too is reflected in commentary by the team members. Lisa 
Webb contextualizes the shutdown retraining as having a “quality focus,” while Chris Wright 
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assures the audience that “Our senior management has been speaking with us – they ask us to 
continue to look for ways to improve quality.”
80
 In sum, the video couples the reality of the 
shutdown with the refocus on quality through more attention to problem solving. While problem 
solving may not be part of the atonement process, it can be argued that, in Toyota’s case, 
problem solving constitutes part of the learning process which is part of the Toyota Way. In 
engaging in, and reflecting upon, this learning process, the Kentucky plant team members’ 
actions reflect the Shinto sensibility of development as a way to ‘adapt to new demands while at 
the same time staying centered, balanced, and agile.”
81
 Moreover, the renewed commitment to 
learning within the Kentucky plant reflects Sakichi Toyoda’s mandate that that one should 
“always be studious and creative, striving to stay ahead of the times.”
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Finally, there is an indication in this video that Toyota is preparing to move beyond the 
crisis. Even as the Kentucky Toyota team members were sharing their learning experiences 
during the shutdown, they were also talking about their community service efforts as members of 
the larger Georgetown community. For example Lisa Webb’s talk of the training efforts during 
the shutdown leads into a discussion on team members’ community efforts: “A lot of the team 
members here volunteer outside of work. It’s just really enriched the community and, ah, even 
when we weren’t working there for a while we were out, people were out working, volunteering 
in the community doing stuff.”
83
 Brian talks of his own efforts in volunteering with his kids’ 
activities “band, robotics, and 4-H,” but he also talks of Toyota’s actions in terms of being a 
good corporate citizen whose “impact on the community has been great.”
84
 This video marks the 
first time in Toyota’s written and visual atonement rhetoric that bolstering is evident and separate 
from its crisis rhetoric.  
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Charity beyond the recall 
Charity is perhaps the most binding commitment of the atonement process because it is 
where the promises for change are manifested through reparation. Charity demonstrates that the 
offender is taking steps to “develop a different kind of present and future.” 
85
 In Toyota’s case, 
charity was enacted in two ways. First, as evidence in the preceding analysis of the company’s 
atonement messages, the company admitted its mistakes, confronted the policies that had driven 
the company off the road, and instituted programs to quickly and efficiently fix the problems 
with its customers’ cars. Additionally, in the spring of 2010 Toyota agreed to pay a 16.4 million-
dollar fine levied by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
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Second, the most ambitious acts of charity occurred as Toyota transcended the growth-
oriented management philosophies of the previous ten years and returned to the Toyota Way. 
This shift in culture was marked by Akio Toyota’s explicit plans about instituting long-term 
organizational changes so that a recall of the 2010 magnitude would not occur again. Within the 
year and into 2011, Toyota’s changed culture became apparent to those in the automotive media 
world. In his Washington Post message, Akio Toyoda had outlined a series of reforms to ensure 
that “problems of this magnitude do not happen again and that we not only meet but exceed the 
high safety standards that have defined our long history.”
87
 He promised a top-to-bottom review, 
and part of that mandate was the establishment of an Automotive Center for Quality Excellence. 
That center opened five months later in Ann Arbor, Michigan, with plans to instruct “10,000 
employees annually on new quality measures.”
88
 Along with the Center for Excellence, Toyoda 
promised an outside “blue-ribbon advisory group,” to evaluate production processes.
89
 By June 
of 2010 Micheline Maynard of the New York Times reported that the group had been formed and 
would be led by Rodney Slater, former secretary of transportation.
90
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Another promised reform was to “aggressively investigate complaints we hear directly 
from consumers and move more quickly to address any safety issues we identify.”
91
 The 
movement on this reform was swift. Mark Rechtin and Hans Greimel, in a January 2011 story for 
Automotive News, reported that Toyota had created Swift Market Analysis Response Teams 
(SMART) “soon after the start of the recall.”
92
 According to Rechtin and Greimel, SMART 
“analyzed more than 5000 consumer complaints of unintended acceleration, as well as 2,000 
other safety questions.”
93
 Another example of Toyota’s renewed vigor in addressing safety issues 
was the April recall of the Lexus GX 460 for, what was characterized as a, “dangerous handling 
problem.”
94
 Micheline Maynard of the New York Times reported that within twenty-four hours 
production of the Lexus had been suspended, demonstrating “that it had learned the lessons of 
dawdling during a safety crisis.”
95
 Although Maynard and her colleagues characterized the recall 
– prompted by a Consumer Reports test drive – as perhaps being an “overreaction,” Steven St. 
Angelo, Toyota’s North American chief quality officer offered another perspective on recall. 
Declaring that “recall is not a four-letter work,” St. Angelo went to explain “If it’s suspicious, 
I’m going to do the recall. I am not proud of recalls, but I am proud of taking fast action.”
96
 St. 
Angelo’s comments reflect the marked changed in Toyota’s attitude towards acknowledging and 
fixing mistakes.  
Another reform promised by Akio Toyoda was to increase the transparency of the 
company by sharing quality and safety information, and increased outreach to government 
agencies. Specifically, this meant that control of decisions, long centralized in Japan, needed to 
be decentralized. According to Micheline Maynard, in interviews with “current and former 
executives at Toyota, government regulators and others who deal regularly with the company,” 
Akio Toyoda had begun to “bridge the gap between the company’s Japanese corporate culture 
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and its biggest and most important market, the United States.”
97
 Some of these changes included 
Japanese engineers actively seeking out suggestions for improvement from American executives, 
Toyota putting more Americans in charge of U.S. factories, and the company appointing quality 
control officers in the company’s major world markets, including North America.
98
 According to 
Eric Mayne and Drew Winter, these quality control officers, such as Steve St. Angelo, have 
“unfettered access to the top of the house,” meaning St. Angelo has “a direct line to Akio 
Toyota.”
99
 Through such actions, Toyota, which had been characterized as closed and secretive, 
demonstrated in tangible ways its willingness to change.  
Finally, Toyota demonstrated its commitment to learning and putting people first in its 
actions regarding the American company that had produced the defective accelerator pedal.  
The Indiana-based company, CTS Corporation, had issued a statement in late January declaring 
that its accelerator pedals, “should absolutely not be linked with any sudden unintended 
accelerator incidents.”
100
 Toyota wisely chose not to engage in blame-shifting. Instead, Dino 
Trianlefyllos, Vice-President of Quality for Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing, 
North America, told Eric Mayne and Drew Winter of Wards Autoworld, that Toyota “spent more 
time with CTS in making sure there were no additional risks, working with them like we work 
with all our suppliers to improve their process.”
101
 By refusing to engage in intra-organizational 
squabbling and reaching out to CTS to improve its production processes, Toyota not only 
retained what it clearly considered a valuable corporate partner, but was able to maintain a focus 
on communicating with their customers, rather than engaging in public communication that 
would have detracted from the atonement campaign. Moreover, I would argue, Toyota’s actions 
with CTS were also indicative of Shinto values of interdependence in which two entities 
complete each other and thus achieve harmony. Engaging in intra-organizational scapegoating 
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damages social harmony; by working with CTS to improve its production processes, Toyota 
acknowledged its own dependence on CTS. 
In summary, Toyota demonstrated through tangible actions that there had been a shift 
from a culture fixated on growth and market dominance to a culture re-focused on learning and 
respect for people.  
Audience Reaction to Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement 
According to Frank Ahrens of the Washington Post, a company in the midst of a crisis 
must “win the message,” if there is to be a successful resolution to the crisis.
102
 In terms of 
winning the atonement message there must be recognition and acceptance by the audience of the 
atonement messages from the offending party. In this respect, Toyota was successful. For 
example, Frank Ahrens argued that while Toyota’s messages “take a variety of paths, they all 
lead to the same message. We know something’s wrong. We’re sorry. We’re trying to fix it. Our 
cars are safe.”
103
  Journalist Patricia Faulhaber also noted the consistency of the atonement 
messages arguing that Toyota created a “consistent tone and message,” in which “the messages 
are we are sorry, we are working to correct the problems and to restore customer confidence.”
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Alex Nunez, writing for Autoblog, echoed these comments in his observation that “Toyota’s 
primary focus is on re-establishing itself as a business that’s deserving of consumers trust. That 
starts with saying ‘I’m sorry’ as frequently and in as many different venues as possible.”
105
 
Toyota’s messages were clearly perceived as not only apologetic but generally as messages 
indicative of the company’s intent to act on resolving its problems.  
However, there were instances where some commentators found individual messages, 
especially those expressed in printed form to be weak. While generally supportive of Toyota’s 
overall atonement messages, Frank Ahrens was critical with how Toyota characterized the time 
91 
 
frame of the recall. Ahrens pointed to possible “potholes,” in the campaign, taking issue with 
Toyota’s characterization of the crisis in terms of “in recent days,” in its “Commitment,” video 
and “Lot of Talk,” print ad. Ahrens wrote, “In point of fact, the only thing that happened in 
“recent days” was the actual recall. Toyota was forced to make the recalls because the company 
hadn’t lived up to its standards for at least several months prior.”
106
 Public Relations consultant 
Lou Hoffman expressed concerns about Toyota’s “Open Letter,” message. While noting that 
Toyota appeared to have intended the message to “address the issue head on,” Hoffman 
criticized the lack of a forthright apology for the accelerator issues, characterizing the letter as 
“possibly a case of copywriting by committee with legal chairing the effort.”
107
  However, 
Hoffman viewed the subsequent “Lot of Talk,” more favorably, acknowledging the “straight 
forward,” and “no nonsense tone” of the letter.
108
 The shift from Hoffman’s earlier criticism of 
Toyota’s first print ad as written with legal issues in mind, to a more favorable read of the second 
print ad may be an indication that Toyota was shaping its atonement response to meet the needs 
of its American audience’s expectations for explicit and direct communication. Indeed, Toyota 
spokesperson Celeste Migliore confirmed the company’s attention to customer response noting 
that “we’re talking consistently with our customers and measuring their response to us.”
109
  
While there were concerns about the effectiveness of some of Toyota’s written atonement 
messages, the video campaign was viewed as effective. Marketing and advertising entrepreneur, 
Alaya Rahav, characterized Toyota’s campaign as “admitting directly we have messed up, 
harnessing all the workers as committed to amend and restore your faith in us.”
110
 In particular, 
the “Commitment” video ad was singled out for its effectiveness. For example, Patricia 
Faulhaber argued that not only did  “the company admit they made mistakes in quality control,” 
in the “Commitment” video, but that “the spot is a really good commercial and goes from where 
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Toyota was in consumer’s [sic] minds to what they did wrong to what they hope for in the 
future.”
111
  Alex Nunez commended Toyota for creating a “message that is simple and well 
delivered: Toyota messed up big time, it knows it, and it’s fully aware that the onus is on itself to 
win back customers confidence.”
112
 Again, the message of having make mistakes and rectifying 
those mistakes was recognized as central elements of the video spots. 
Moreover, linking the Commitment video to other printed messages was viewed as 
effective. USA Today reporter, Chris Woodyard acknowledged the successful pairing of the print 
and video venues contending that the “Commitment” video ad “acknowledges that the automaker 
has let down customers when it came to safety,” while the print ads not only lay out “blueprints 
for the fixes,” but also focus on customers.
113
  Alaya Rahav also argued “this commitment ad, 
together with an open letter in the Washington Post from Toyota’s president that enhance 
the commitment ad, are very brave direct steps to reinstitute credibility, trust in the company and 
brand reliability.”
114
 Patricia Faulhaber commended the actions of Akio Toyota, praising him for 
“taking the blame on himself and also taking the responsibility for turning the quality control 
problems around and making the consumer believe in Toyota’s vehicles again.”
115
  
While media experts viewed Toyota’s campaign as generally successful quantitative data 
also supports the contention that the atonement campaign was successful. According to Nick 
Bunkley, Toyota sales for March of 2010 were up 41 percent over March 2009 sales.
116
 In a May 
15, 2010 article in The Economist, Toyota “surprised analysts,” when the company reported a net 
income of $1.2 billion for the first three months of the year.
117
 Additionally, Rich Thomaselli of 
Advertising Age reported that Toyota reported a $2.3 billion profit for the fiscal year after 
suffering “two consecutive years of losses.”
118
 While both Bunkley and Thomaselli pointed that 
Toyota had offered incentives during the recall that could account for the rise in sales for March, 
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General Motors and Ford also offered incentives in the form of zero-percent interest loans and 
their sales reflected a 43 and 40 percent increase in sales.
119
 Moreover, despite offering 
incentives similar to those of General Motors and Ford, Chrysler’s sales decline by 8 percent.
120
 
 It is conceivable then that while offering incentives may have contributed to Toyota’s 
first quarter profits for 2010, there may be other factors at work. One possible explanation is that 
Toyota customers – the very audience the atonement campaign targeted – were persuaded not to 
abandon the company. For example, 60 percent of Toyota’s sales during that period went to past 
customers.
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 Ted Marzilli, BrandIndex global managing director, contended that Toyota 
convinced “a lot of existing customers that the crisis is behind them and they can be trusted 
again.”
122
 Polling data backs up Marzilli’s contention. A Gallup Poll taken in the last week of 
February 2010 found 74 percent of Toyota owners “had not lost confidence in Toyota 
vehicles.”
123
 Additionally, an April 2010 survey conducted by Rasmussen Reports found that “40 
percent of respondents who own a Toyota said they’re very likely to buy their vehicle from that 
company with another 24 percent somewhat likely to do so.”
124
 Finally, Harvard Business 
Review conducted its own poll in early March and found that “contrary to media 
prognostications, the recalls don't appear to have affected the Toyota brand image adversely 
among its customers. Toyota owners, compared to owners of other vehicles, agreed more 
strongly that Toyota appropriately handled issues with respect to the brake-pedal recall; they 
were more likely to say they believed that this incident is an outlier, [sic] that typically Toyota 
has a strong reputation for quality, and that the recall shows Toyota's commitment to customer 
safety.”
125
 Because part of the recall was the atonement campaign, it is reasonable to assume that 
atoning to its customers helped shape those customers’ perception of Toyota as a company 
committed to the needs of its customers.  
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Why Toyota’s Rhetoric of Atonement Succeeded 
The success of Toyota’s rhetoric lies in the fulfillment of its atonement. Not only did the 
company admit its mistakes and apologize for its bungled approach to the recalls, but Toyota 
demonstrated mortification through the production shutdown as well as by humbling itself and 
paying fines levied by the NHTSA. Additionally, Toyota publically acknowledged that changes 
within the company were needed to avoid a similar recall catastrophe in the future and then, 
within the eight weeks of the atonement campaign, and throughout the next year, Toyota 
instituted those changes.  
Toyota’s atonement was also successful because of the manner in which it approached its 
atonement message.  Throughout their atonement campaign the company demonstrated its 
willingness to shape its messages to meet the needs of its customers. Clearly, the shift from 
framing the recall as a concern for customers to one where Toyota assumed the responsibility for 
its mistakes demonstrates this shift. Moreover, both print and video messages were clear, 
concise, and consistent. As noted earlier by Chris Woodyard, the print ads functioned as 
“blueprints for the fixes.”
126
 Toyota clearly spelled out what actions the company was taking, 
and would take in the future to resolve the crisis. In doing so, the print ads functioned as a 
contract of sorts between the company and its customers. Meanwhile, the success of the video 
spots rests in the strong narrative that allowed Toyota to bolster its pre-crisis reputation as a 
producer of historically quality cars, while showing what was being done to address the crisis in 
terms of putting people first, and learning through the crisis how to better meet the needs of 
customers.   
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Toyota’s atonement was also successful because Akio Toyoda finally stepped up, and 
more importantly, stepped out to lead the beleaguered company through the crisis. Toyoda’s 
clear written apology in the Washington Post editorial and his careful mapping out of what 
Toyota would do to rectify the mistakes that had led to the recall in the first place were viewed as 
strong moves. Moreover, the print and video ads demonstrated that from the executive suite to 
the production line, Toyota as a company recognized, publically acknowledged, and acted to 
rectify the mistakes made. 
Outside of atonement functioning to heal the breech between the company and its 
customers, atonement also provided the path that allowed the company to return to the narratives, 
ideology and values that characterize the Toyota Way. As argued in chapter three, one of most 
important virtues of Shinto is mokoto, or sincerity. Sincerity rests upon the “careful avoidance of 
error in word or deed.”
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 Clearly, Toyota violated those norms in the months leading up to the 
January production shutdown. Thus, it was incumbent that words and deeds be at the forefront of 
Toyota’s atonement efforts. That is precisely what Toyota did through its print and visual 
messages. By reflecting on its own history, Toyota bolstered the values of respect for people and 
continuous learning. The function of bolstering is to reinforce “the existence of a fact, sentiment, 
object, or relationship,” between the organization and its audiences.
128
 In Toyota’s case, 
bolstering within the campaign functioned to heal the breech between the company and its 
customers by telling the story of why Toyota had earned the trust of customers over 50 years of 
producing vehicles. By telling the story of the company’s history of trust, and by showing 
current Toyota team members attention to the customer during the recall, and learning through 
the recall, Toyota demonstrated that it was worthy of being perceived as trustworthy by the 
community of American Toyota owners.  
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Conclusion 
Toyota’s eight-week atonement campaign was a successful attempt to repair the breech 
between the company and its American customers. As evidenced by media critics, automobile 
industry insiders, and the actions of Toyota customers, the campaign was largely successful. 
First, the atonement campaign was successful because Toyota halted production, thus focusing 
attention on its subsequent actions. Second, Toyota “got it” in terms of how to communicate best 
with its American audience. Using print ads to lay out concrete, specific, and precise actions met 
the audience’s need for direct messages of promised action. Using video spots showed promises 
being carried out.  Additionally, the videos contextualized the recall in terms of Toyota’s long 
history of producing reliable cars. Finally, the atonement campaign provided a way back to the 
Toyota Way for a company that had chased the ambition of becoming the world’s number one 
producer of cars to the detriment of its grounding values and ideology. 
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Chapter 5 
“Moving Forward”: 
Toyota’s Road Trip Post-Crisis & Final Considerations of This Study
1
 
 
Toyota’s Post-Crisis Return to Normality 
 Toyota’s post-crisis return to normality was been marked by highs and lows. In February 
of 2011, the results of the 10-month investigation conducted by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) as to whether or not electronic problems were at the heart of the 
apparent sudden acceleration were announced. The result? According to Mark Rechtin of 
Automotive News, the NASA investigation “cleared Toyota of electronic flaws in its throttle 
control system.”
2
 Thus, the car company’s repair of  close to 1.7 million vehicles for the floor 
mat entrapment and sticky accelerator issues proved the prudent move.
3
Moreover, NASA 
engineers said “floormat [sic] interference and sticky gas pedals - both the subject to recall in 
2010 – caused incidents of runaway vehicles,” as well as drivers mistaking the accelerator for the 
brake.
4
  Following the NASA announcement, Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood 
announced that Toyota vehicles were “safe to drive,” an announcement that produced a surge in 
Toyota’s brand perception.
5
 According to Ted Marzilli, writing for YouGov BrandIndex, “in the 
two days after the announcement, Toyota’s BrandIndex scores significantly outpaced movement 
seen in the aggregate auto sector,” giving the company “a big lift in consumer esteem.”
6
  Toyota 
seemed to be back on track.  
That was short-lived. On March 11, 2011, an 8.9-magnitude earth quake rocked northern 
Japan setting off a devastating tsunami. Toyota suspended operations for five days with an 
expected loss of production amounting to 40,000 vehicles.
7
 In an April 22, 2011 press release, 
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Toyota announced that it expected normalization of its Japanese production by November or 
December of 2011, and production outside of Japan to be back to normal by August of 2011.
8
 
However, Mark Rechtin reported that by June of 2011 there was a “full production of eight core 
North-American built Toyota models.”
9
 While Toyota did see operating profits drop by $4.4 
billion for the fiscal year ending in March of 2012, auto analyst Christopher Richter observed 
that even with these losses, Toyota was “already touching the pre-quake levels,” and was poised 
to “win back” some of the market share lost during the 2010 recall.
10
 It could not have hurt 
Toyota when it lost its dubious distinction for mounting the largest recall in history to Honda’s 
2011 air-bag recall.
11
 More recently, in February of 2012, J.D. Powers announced their annual 
“Dependability Study Results.” Toyota took eight of the fourteen segments: sub-compact car, 
compact car, compact sporty-car, entry-premiere car, compact multi-purpose vehicle, midsize 
cross-over SUV, mini-van, and large pick-up.
12
 Finally, as this study concludes in late April of 
2012, Toyota Motor Corporation has reclaimed its status as the world’s number one carmaker 
based on production numbers for the first quarter of 2012.
13
 Clearly, Toyota Motor Corporation 
has come a long way since its initial failed communication with customers. In this final chapter I 
summarize the study as a whole, discuss the implications that emerged from the study as well as 
the study’s limitations and areas of future research. 
Summary 
In the previous chapters I have illuminated Toyota Motor Corporation’s crisis 
communication during the recall of early 2010. In chapter one, I discussed audience 
dissatisfaction with the company’s initial communication, and the failure of Akio Toyota to step 
up and lead his company in the run-up to and early days of the recall. The body of research into 
apologia, and its application to organizational crises, was reviewed, followed by an argument 
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that it is important to focus on the constraints on organizational rhetors, rather than the strategies 
or event types proposed by other researchers. The argument for culture as a constraint was made 
with a subsequent discussion of how cultural practices of Japanese communication in general, 
and public relations practices in particular, may not meet the expectations of an American 
audience. The first chapter ended with an explication of an inductive research approach. 
Chapter two grounded the 2010 recall in a larger historical framework in which I argued 
that Toyota lost it organizational cultural bearings as explicated within the Toyota Way. Over a 
ten-year period, non-Toyoda family leaders shifted the company’s focus from a company 
dedicated to respect for people and a spirit of continuous learning, to a company myopically 
focused on profit and growth. It was this focus that initially limited the effectiveness of the 
company’s apologia during the recall. I then turned to a discussion of the deeper cultural roots of 
Shrine Shinto and how this worldview informs the Toyota Way. My contention here was that 
Toyota’s focus on growth and profits violated Shinto values of interdependence, trust and 
operating as a company of character. Moreover, I argued, the way to rectify this situation and 
regain the Toyota Way was to find an appropriate rhetorical response that would explicitly 
address the expectations of the American Toyota audience and regain the trust of that audience.  
The focus of chapter three centered on atonement rhetoric as the appropriate rhetorical 
response to the crisis. Scholarship related to this sub-genre of apologia was used to support my 
argument that poorly handled product recalls, such as the 2010 Toyota fiasco, constituted 
instances where traditional strategies of apologia will be viewed by consumers as disingenuous 
or downright hypocritical. In these cases, I contended, organizations must come clean – repent 
for their failed actions, reflect on the circumstances that led to the “sin,” demonstrate that the 
company has suffered, and then move beyond the “sin” by offering appropriate charity or 
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reparation. Moreover, I argued that while atonement rhetoric is not strictly a ritual, the rhetorical 
form of repentance, reflection, and charity, does constitute a ritualized response. As such, 
atonement rhetoric constitutes an appropriate response to the crisis given the ritualized nature of 
Japanese communication and the American audience’s preference for direct messages that the 
audience can readily interpret as atonement. Atonement also provided a way for Toyota to not 
only reflect on the circumstances that had precipitated the recall, but to also reflect on how those 
circumstances had led to a violation of the Toyota Way, and could provide a way back to the 
company’s philosophical roots. 
In chapter four, Toyota’s rhetoric of atonement was illustrated with print and You Tube 
messages that addressed the recall over an eight-week campaign. The chapter began with the 
run-up to the January 2010 recall, Toyota’s less-then-stellar response to the 2009 San Diego 
crash that served as the center of attention on alleged unexpected acceleration issues, and then 
the company’s “got it” moment when the shift to atonement occurred. I argued that the coupling 
of the “Temporary Pause,” ad and the production shutdown constituted a successful liminal 
moment that provided a way for Toyota to create a separate rhetorical space for its atonement 
campaign. Through the use of print ads, that functioned as explicit, discursive contracts between 
the company and its customers, and the use of video in order to contextualize the recall as a 
learning experience and a return to the Toyota Way, Toyota not only demonstrated its ability to 
atone to its customers, but was also able to rededicate itself to the Toyota Way. Moreover, Akio 
Toyoda emerged as the strongest voice of atonement, explicating where the company had made 
mistakes in communicating with customers, reflecting publically on those mistakes, and laying 
out a course of action to rectify those mistakes. Finally, the critiques of marketing, public 
relations, and auto industry savvy critics, were cited as indicators of the overall strength of 
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Toyota’s efforts as well as some of its communicative weaknesses in terms of the recall. 
Additionally quantitative data demonstrating Toyota’s ability to regain sales and keep customers 
was cited.  
Implications and Inquiry 
Overall this study of Toyota’s rhetorical response to the 2010 recall crisis extends our 
understanding of how atonement rhetoric functions within a corporate context. Three important 
implications emerge from this study. 
First, the study focuses on the importance of atonement that is viewed as authentic by the 
audience. By acknowledging its mistakes, demonstrating mortification, and seeking to rectify 
those mistakes, an organization is able to bridge the breach of trust and reestablish congruency 
between itself and its publics. Especially key to demonstrating that the atonement is authentic is 
the second stage – reflection. The act of public reflection and mortification serves as a window 
into the soul of the organization under scrutiny. As such, atonement functions to demonstrate that 
the organization has repented, will make reparations to the aggrieved parties and is therefore a 
good corporate citizen who deserves to be seen as a decent and caring member of the 
community. If an organization fails to successfully demonstrate a reflective stance and 
accompanying mortification, it is likely that the audience will be less inclined to view the 
organization in a favorable light. This may explain the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement. 
When the big banks accepted the bailout there were no acts of contrition on their part.
14
 They 
failed to send a message that they had learned from their mistakes and would change their 
actions. It is reasonable to assume that the coupling of the bailout, with the subsequent awarding 
of bonuses, only served to drive home the message that those in the financial sector did not have 
the public’s care and wellbeing in mind. Thus another line of inquiry could focus on the 
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perceived need for atonement as an impetus for social movements such as the Occupy 
movement.  
Second, the Toyota study illuminates how corporate entities can shift from 
communication that is not meeting the expectations of audiences to atonement as a means for 
successfully addressing the expectations.  There was no rationale for shutting down production 
and publically announcing that shutdown in the nature of the crisis itself. Toyota could have 
chosen to maintain production but taken other steps in responding to the crisis. For example, the 
company could have issued a press release indicating that it would begin sending notification 
letters to customers affected by the recall. The fact that the company did shut down the line and 
announced that shutdown through the “Temporary Pause” ad indicates that such a pre-emptive 
act of sacrifice served as an attention getter for the subsequent atonement.  
A third implication of this study is that authentic atonement can bridge differing cultural 
approaches to crisis communication. Previous scholarship has demonstrated how atonement 
functions in contemporary America. Atonement, as a way of maintaining societal harmony, cuts 
across cultures, and this indicates the power of atonement as a sub-genre. As this study has 
demonstrated, Japanese atonement is shaped by Shinto beliefs in the continuing cultivation of the 
seven virtues towards walking in the “way of nature.” Sincerity (makoto) as the “careful 
avoidance of error in word or deed” is the way an organization demonstrates that it is worthy of 
being viewed as trustworthy by the society in which it operates.
15
 Atonement rhetoric provides a 
way for an organization to demonstrate its sincerity by communicating and taking action to 
rectify the situation. When words become deeds, then one is perceived by the community as 
being trustworthy. A possible line of future inquiry would be to explore other cultural indicators 
of atonement and how these indicators influence or do not influence corporate atonement. 
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Limitations and Inquiry 
Every study has its limitations and out of limitations emerge opportunities for future 
research. In the case of this study, scope emerges as a primary limitation. The scope of this study 
was limited to Toyota’s atonement to its customers. The study did not look at Toyota’s efforts to 
discredit faulty research into the electronic throttle issue, and Toyota did vigorously oppose any 
suggestion that electronics were the core issue of the alleged unexpected acceleration problems. 
There was no atonement here, but another apologia strategy, denial, was used. According to 
Drew Winter, “Toyota methodically DIS-sected then summarily dismissed a university 
professor’s claim that a short-circuit could create unintended acceleration in a Toyota vehicle 
without triggering an electronic error code.”
16
  Instead, Toyota countered with studies of its own 
conducted by “teams of engineering and electronics experts from Stanford University and 
California-based Exponent Inc., an engineering consulting firm.”
17
  In this case, Toyota’s 
exoneration by NASA demonstrates that denial can be an effective strategy.  A possible line of 
inquiry that emerges from the scope issue would be to conduct a broader study exploring how 
atonement rhetoric fit into other messages that Toyota created during the crisis.  
Second, the study did not focus on all of Akio Toyoda’s rhetoric during the recall, 
including his testimony to the congressional sub-committee, his visit to the Kentucky production 
plant, or his Japanese press conferences. Because Toyoda was widely criticized for his lack of 
communication during the early days of the crisis, a study focusing solely on his communicative 
efforts during the crisis could shed light on how he transcended “no show Akio,” to being 
characterized as a moving force for the success of the atonement campaign.
18
 Another possible 
111 
 
line of research could focus on Toyoda’s post-crisis leadership as illuminated by his 
communication to investors, the media, customers, and the Toyota production family worldwide. 
In a related vein, the rhetoric of American presidents has been a foundational line of inquiry for 
scholars of rhetoric that has shaped our understanding of the power of the presidency. Modern 
corporations, especially large multi-national corporations such as Toyota, are led by similarly 
powerful figures. Long-term, in-depth study of the rhetoric of the women and men who lead 
these companies should be undertaken to provide a similar understanding of the influence of 
these individuals on their companies and the society in which companies operate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter I have explicated the implications of the current study as well as the 
limitations of the study. Both the implications and limitations open doors to future inquiry on the 
nature of atonement in the corporate arena, the nature of atonement as a bridge between differing 
cultural approaches to communication, and the wider study of the rhetoric of corporate leaders. 
Toyota Motor Corporation successfully engaged in a rhetoric of atonement that not only 
met the expectations of its American customers but also provided a way for the company to 
return to the Toyota Way. Toyota’s challenge for the future is to balance sustained growth with a 
focus on respecting the customer. Certainly, Akio Toyoda recognizes the importance of 
maintaining an audience-center communication focus. When asked in a September 2010 
interview about whether Toyota had successfully repaired its broken relationship with 
consumers, he replied: “It’s not I who will make that judgment. Customers in the market are the 
ones to judge whether our actions were correct and successful.”
19
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Five Main Principles of Toyoda
1
 
 Always be faithful to your duties, thereby contributing to the company and to the overall 
good. 
 Always be studious and creative, striving to stay ahead of the times. 
 Always be practical and avoid frivolousness. 
 Always strive to build a homelike atmosphere at work that is warm and friendly. 
 Always have respect for spiritual matters, and remember to be grateful at all times. 
 
Guiding Principles at Toyota
2
 
1. Honor the language and spirit of the law of every nation and undertake open and fair 
business activities to be a good corporate citizen of the world. 
2. Respect the culture and customs of every nation and contribute to economic and social 
development through corporate activities in their respective communities. 
3. Dedicate our business to providing clean and safe products and to enhancing the quality 
of life everywhere through all of our activities. 
4. Create and develop advanced technologies and provide outstanding products and services 
that fulfill the needs of customers worldwide. 
5. Foster a corporate culture that enhances both individual creativity and the value of 
teamwork, while honoring mutual trust and respect between labor and management. 
6. Pursue growth through harmony with the global community via innovative management. 
7. Work with business partners in research and manufacture to achieve stable, long-term 
growth and mutual benefits, while keeping ourselves open to new partnerships.  
                                                 
1
  Toyota Motor Corporation, “Five Main Principles of Toyoda,” May 15, 2012, available  
http://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/guiding_principles.html 
 
2
 Toyota Motor Corporation, “Guiding Principles at Toyota,” May 15, 2012, available  http://www.toyota-
global.com/company/vision_philosophy/guiding_principles.html 
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